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TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES

Richard Gordon*
At least since the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) first
published its Forty Recommendations, financial institutions in FATFcompliant jurisdictions have been required to implement preventive
measures that require Fls to identifY customers, establish client profiles,
monitor for unusual transactions, review those transactions to see if there
was suspicion that they involved the proceeds of crime and, if so, report the
transaction to the authorities in the form of a suspicious transaction report
(STR). When these requirements were first established, neither financial
institutions nor their supervisors/regulators had much experience as to
what in a client's profile and the client's patterns of transactions might
indicate money laundering. However, based on an expanding knowledge of
how criminals tend to launder their money, over time financial institutions
have developed increasingly effective detection and reporting systems. By
studying known examples of laundering, the FATF, FATF-Style Regional
Bodies, and national competent authorities (especially financial intelligence
units) have identified patterns or indicators ofpossible money laundering,
and made them available to financial institutions as money laundering
typologies. In addition, there has been some feedback from financial
intelligence units and other competent authorities to financial institutions
with respect to their anti-money laundering programs. Using these sources,
financial institutions have been able to develop systems to help them
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Adjunct Associate
Professor of International Studies, Brown University. B.A. Yale (1978). J.D. Harvard Law
School (1984). This preliminary report is to be used in the completion of a consolidated
report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern University, the Honorable Susan Eckert of
Brown University, and Professor Gordon. The consolidated report will include cases from
jurisdictions other than the U.S. as well as additional analytical discussion and bibliographical material to be provided by Professor Passas and Ms. Eckert. Professor Passas and Ms.
Eckert were equal participants in the scope and planning of the preliminary report on the
U.S. and provided significant guidance and editorial assistance in its drafting. Student assistants included Mark Skerry, Jonathan Calka, Daniel Straka, Pratibha Gupta, Jiajia Xu, AI
Patel, Dan Tsai, Sam Mimoto, and Sean Stevens. Special thanks are given to Jeffrey Breinhold of the U.S. Justice Department for compiling the list of terrorism-related prosecutions
used in the preliminary report and to the numerous Assistant U.S. Attorneys who provided
materials relevant to the cases examined. Craig Boise, Willie Maddox, and Emile van de
Does de Willebois provided helpful commentary. This study was financed in part by the
Financial Market Integrity Group of the World Bank.
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determine which transactions carry a materially greater risk that
laundering is involved
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF
adopted the VIII Special Recommendations on terrorist financing. Among
these new requirements were that financial institutions also report to
authorities if they suspected that a transaction involved the financing of
terrorism. However, there was little in the wcry of known patterns of
terrorism financing that financial institutions could use to help identify such
transactions. While since that time a number of limited typology studies
have been made available by the FATF, no comprehensive study of
terrorism financing typologies has yet been published For this reason, the
Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force requested.a comprehensive
study on past terrorism financing techniques that would add to value to
efforts by both financial institutions and governmental authorities in
identifying terrorism financing transactions or patterns, also known as
typologies.
This preliminary report on prosecutions in the US examined 266
instances of prosecutions that involve charges of terrorism, material
support of terrorism, or other terrorism-related matters. Of that number,
thirty were determined to involve financial institutions. Using only publicly
available information, the study found twenty-four where there was
sufficient information on financial transactions to see if there were any
discernible patterns or typologies for terrorism financing. The study
revealed that sixteen of those indicated known typologies of money
laundering, although an additional three appear to involve diversion of
charitable donations. In only one was there a typology that suggested
possible terrorism financing and not laundering. Of the sixteen cases
involving suspicious transactions only three appeared to involve criminal
proceeds. From these cases, it appears that terrorists often use money
laundering techniques to disguise the origins of funds or to prevent
competent authorities from tracing pcryments from end-users to originators,
even when the origin is not criminal proceeds. However, because it was not
possible to review any STRs (referred to in the US. as Suspicious Activity
Reports or SARs) that mcry have been filed by financial institutions with
respect to these transactions, it was not possible to determine if financial
institutions, in conducting their review of those transactions, had
determined that they were suspicious with respect to money laundering or
terrorism financing. It was also impossible to know if FinCEN had referred
such SARs to law enforcement for further investigation, or if they had added
actionable intelligence to the SARs that would suggest either money
laundering or terrorism financing. Such reviews would be most helpful in
completing the study.
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I. THE GLOBAL STANDARD AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERRORISM FINANCINd

A.

Overview

Over the past forty years, anti-money laundering rules have been
expanded and refined. 2 The vast majority of the world's jurisdictions now
1
Some of the introductory material for this Report is adopted from Richard K. Gordon,
Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 699 (2008) [hereinafter Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?] and Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'LL. 503 (2011).
2
The first anti-money laundering law enacted in the U.S. was The Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-59 (2000), 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314(e), 5316-5530, 5332(2)
(2000), and 18 U.S.C. §§1956-1957, 1960 (2009)) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act]. Antimoney laundering laws were expanded in 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, and 2004.
History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FmCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/aml_
history.html (last visited May 20, 2012) (FinCEN is the U.S. financial intelligence unit); see
also Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Criminal Law: The Tenuous Relationship Between the
Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRJM. L. &
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endorse the latest version of the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF)
Forty Recommendations
on
Money Laundering
(FATF
40
RecommendationsY and accompanying Methodology for Assessment. 4
CRIMINOLOGY 3ll, 338-69 (2003) (exploring the federal laws and regulations available to
prosecute money laundering). The ED's efforts began in 1991 with its first anti-money laundering Directive. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 (EC). They were
expanded significantly with the second and third anti-money laundering Directives in 2001
and 2004. Council Directive 2001/97/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 (EC); Council Directive
2005/60/EEC, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 (EC); see also Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation:
Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying with Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18
TRANSNAT'L L. 395, 408-10, 414 (2005) (discussing the development of anti-money laundering law in the EU). The first multilateral convention including anti-money laundering provisions came into force in 1988. U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This was followed by conventions expanding anti-money laundering provisions. See,
e.g., The Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. No. 141 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993)
[hereinafter Strasbourg Convention]; U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Sept. 29, 2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. The Financial Action Task Force published its
first set of 40 Recommendations on money laundering in 1990. These original Recommendations were revised and expanded in 1996. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MONEY LAUNDERING 2 (June 28, 1996); see also FATF, FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS (2003) [hereinafter FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS). Following the attacks
of September 11, 2001, the FATF added 8 Special Recommendations against Terrorism
Finance; a 9th Recommendation was added in 2004. History of the FATF, FATF,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutuslhistoryofthefatf/ (last visited May 21, 2012). Since
the FATF's first set of 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering, the definition of financial institution has been extended, (and certain requirements have been extended to include
some persons who are not financial institutions). In addition, rules on record-keeping have
been tightened, but the general framework of client identification, recordkeeping, client
monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities has not changed. Compare FATF 40
REcoMMENDATIONS, supra, at 16 (defining financial institution as any person or entity engaged in specific transactions, such as accepting deposits, lending, transfers, and others),
with id. at 7 (obligating other institutions, such as casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, lawyers, and trust and company service providers, to adhere to the same standards).
3 FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that 130 countries have endorsed the 40 Recommendations). In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed
the FATF 40 Recommendations (and the FATF VIII Special Recommendations on Terrorist
Financing (2001)), which were amended in 2004 to include Special Recommendation IX.
IMF Advances Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance, IMF (Pub. Info.
Notice No. 02/87, Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter IMF Pub. Notice], available at http://www.imf.
org/extemal/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm; see also IMF, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE
FATF PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD (2002) [hereinafter FATF PLENARY
MEETING], available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/110 802.pdf (proposing endorsement of the FATF Recommendations to the IMF Executive Board). Because
nearly every country in the world is a member of the IMF, this endorsement has significant
resonance. IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, IMF,
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Starting in 1990, these global standards have required financial institutions 5
to monitor the transactions of their customers, to examine unusual
transactions to determine if they might involve the proceeds of crime 6 and
since 200 1-the financing of terrorism, 7 and to report any suspicious
transactions to special government authorities known as financial
intelligence units (FlUs). The Fills then analyze the reports (known as
suspicious transaction reports (STRs)), along with other relevant data, and
make recommendations to law enforcement as to which clients or
transactions should be investigated. 8
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in governments
greatly intensifying their anti-money laundering activities and prompted an
intensified global effort against terrorism financing. 9 In 2002, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank adopted the FATF 40
Recommendations and the eight new Special Recommendations on
Terrorism Financing (Special Recommendations) as a world standard. 10
They, along with the FATF and various regional anti-money laundering
groups known as FATF -Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), also began a joint
global compliance program by assessing the extent to which individual

http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (last visited May 21, 2012). More
importantly, each member of the FATF and each of the eight FATF associate members and
FATF -style regional bodies has endorsed the F ATF 40 Recommendations and Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing the as the global standard for anti- money laundering
and combating the financing of terrorism. See Financial Action Task Force, Members and
Observers, IMF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited
May 21, 20 12) (listing all members ofF ATF); see also PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE
GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, at III7-III-13 (2d ed. 2006), available at http://zunia.org/uploads/media/knowledge/Reference
_Guide_AMLCFT_ 2ndSupplementl.pdf (summarizing F ATF' s mission and F ATF member
obligations).
4 See FATF, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 73 (2009) [hereinafter
METHODOLOGY] (listing the endorsing bodies, including the IMF, World Bank, and a number
of regional financial interest groups).
5
See generally FATF PLENARY MEETING, supra note 3 (detailing the development of the
standards over time).
6
See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7-8 (Recommendations 11-15 directing financial institutions to be aware of certain types of suspicious transactions).
7
See generally FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (2001)
[hereinafter SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS] (proposing recommendations focused on terrorism
for addition to the original recommendations).
8
SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3-5.
9
Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance
and Offshore Centers, 88 N.C.L. REV. 501, 564 (2010).
10
IMF Pub. Notice, supra note 3.
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countries were implementing those standards. 11 Failure to implement the
standards adequately can result in a broad application of sanctions or
countermeasures, including bans on doing business with financial
institutions located within the borders of non-complying jurisdictions. 12 As
a result, millions of STRs have been forwarded to FIUs by financial
institutions throughout the world, although how many have resulted in
further investigation, prosecution, and conviction is not publically
available. 13
The FATF's
40 Recommendations
and the
Special
Recommendations are designed to "provide an enhanced, comprehensive
and consistent framework of measures for combating money laundering and
terrorist financing." 14 Together they cover, among other things, the
criminalization of money laundering and terrorism fmancing, the freezing
and seizing of criminal proceeds and terrorism funds, key preventive
measures against laundering and terrorism financing for financial
institutions and other institutions subject to preventive measures, FIUs, and

11
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 2-3 (stating that a uniform system of assessment, including a single assessment methodology, was agreed to by the IMF, the World Bank and the
FATF in 2002). IMF assessment reports can be found at Detailed Assessment Reports, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/extemal/ns/cs.aspx?id=175 (last updated May 24, 2012). World Bank
assessments can be found at Financial Market Integrity - Assessments, WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/Y902MD2ZLO (last visited May 24, 2012). These bodies and each
of the eight FATF associate members and FATF-style regional bodies (many of which are
undertaken with the participation of the IMF and World Bank) use the uniform assessment
system. FATF assessments can be found at Mutual Evaluations, FATF, http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/ (last visited May 24, 2012) and those of regional bodies
can be found at Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)
- Assessments, IMF, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.htm#reports (last
visited May 24, 2012).
12
See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9 (in particular, Recommendation 21
stating: "[f]inancial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries
which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendation ... Where such a country
continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FA TF Recommendations, countries
should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures."). For example, under Title III, Sec.
31l(a) of the USA Patriot Act, if a financial institution is operating with a jurisdiction outside of the U.S. and there is concern about that jurisdiction's money laundering efforts, the
Secretary of the Treasury "may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of a correspondent account or payable- through account by any domestic
financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution." USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 301 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5) (2004)).
13
E-mail from Boudewijn Verhelst, President, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence
Units, to author (Feb. 27, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Verhelst e-mail].
14
F ATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2 at 2.
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international cooperation. 15 The 40 Recommendations have included similar
preventive measure requirements since the original 1990 draft. 16 In effect,
these Recommendations divide the responsibility for preventing and
uncovering money laundering between the private and public sector.

15
The FA TF 40 Recommendations are broken down into 4 groups. First is Group A, titled
"Legal Systems," which includes the "scope of the criminal offence of money laundering"
and "provisional measures and confiscation." Id. at 3--4. Second is Group B, titled "Measures
to be Taken by Financial Institutions and [certain] Non-Financial Businesses and Professions
to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing," which includes prohibition on shell
banks, customer due diligence and record-keeping (including client identification and transaction monitoring), reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance (including internal
training and audit programs), other measures to deter money laundering and terrorist financing (including sanctions for failure to comply with the Recommendations), measures to be
taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FA TF Recommendations, and regulation and supervision. Id. at 4--10. Third is Group C, titled "Institutional and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing," which includes competent authorities and their powers and resources (including the establishment of a financial intelligence unit) and transparency of legal persons
and arrangements. I d. at 10--12. Fourth is Group D, titled "International Co-operation,"
which includes international commitment to implement various treaties, mutual legal assistance and extradition, and other forms of co-operation. !d. at 12-14. The IX Special Recommendations include: (1) ratification and implementation of UN instruments; (2) criminalizing
the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering; (3) freezing and confiscating
terrorist assets; (4) reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism (also required in
Recommendation 13); (5) international co-operation, (6) alternative remittance systems; (7)
wire transfers; (8) non-profit organizations; and (9) cash couriers. See generally FATF, IX
SPECIAL RECOMMEND AT!ONS (20 10) [hereinafter IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS].
16
Since 1990, there has been a progressive expansion of those persons who must follow
the "preventive measures" provisions in the FATF 40 Recommendations. See FATF, FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS (1990), available at http://www.accessbankplc.com/Library/Documents/
Download%20Centre/FATF.pdf; see also FATF, 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 1295 (1996), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/fatf_40_recommendations.pdf. The current definition of financial institutions includes any person who engages in acceptance of
deposits and other repayable funds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer of
money or value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks,
traveler's checks, money orders and bankers' drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees
and commitments; trading in: money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs, derivatives
etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable securities,
commodity futures trading; participation in securities issues and the provision of financial
services related to such issues; individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping
and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; underwriting and
placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance; and money and currency
changing. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 65-66. Since 2003, most of the preventive
measures prescribed for financial institutions have been extended to certain designated nonfinancial businesses and persons including: casinos (which also includes internet casinos);
real estate agents; dealers in precious metals; dealers in precious stones; lawyers; notaries;
other independent legal professionals and accountants; and trust and company service providers. !d. at 64.
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F ATF Recommendations 5 through 13, plus 21 and 22 (and the
relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of
compliance) set out the part of the preventive measures system that applies
financial institutions. Unfortunately these Recommendations are not a
model of clarity and are not easy for non-experts to comprehend. 17
However, they are designed to create a five-part requirement: 18 fmancial
institutions must (1) establish and maintain customer identity (including
beneficial owner and controller of the legal title holder of the account); (2)
create and maintain an up-to-date customer profile; 19 (3) monitor
transactions to see if they fit with the customer profile of transactions that
are legitimate; (4) if not, examine further any such transaction to see if it
might represent the proceeds of crime or fmancing of terrorism, including
by examining the source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the
FIU, along with a description of why the financial institution believes that
the transaction is suspicious. Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 34
(and the relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for
assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory system to ensure
that the fmancial institution comply with their preventive measures
requirements and the criminal investigation and prosecution system.

17
See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the
Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 137, 159-60 (2011) (describing the
sometimes contradictory and confusing language in the Recommendations). In 2002 an attempt was made by the IMF to reorganize the preventive measures Recommendations into a
more accessible, coherent whole. However, in a series of meetings in 2002 delegations to the
FATF rejected the effort.
18
A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the U.N. Office on
Drugs ands Crime, the World Bank, and the IMF has drafted a model regulation for the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of a model law on antimoney laundering and terrorism financing. The Model Regulation implements these FATF
Recommendations based on the regulatory frameworks in the U.K., Canada, Australia, and
Hong Kong. Article S.l(a}-(e) of the Model Regulation outlines CDD as the "(a) identification of customers, including beneficial owners; (b) gathering of information on customers to
create a customer profile; (c) application of acceptance policies to new customers; (d)
maintenance of customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) monitoring of customer transactions." Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N. Office on Drugs and
Crime). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being "of sufficient nature and detail ... to
monitor the customer's transactions, apply enhanced customer due diligence where necessary, and detect suspicious transactions." Id.
19 If a new customer profile suggests that the customer is opening an account with proceeds of crime, the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. I d.
c
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The financial institution's role focuses on three basic objectives.
The first is to help exclude from the fmancial system possible criminal and
terrorist elements. The FATF 40 and Special IX do this by making financial
institutions identify and profile potential-and, periodically, existingcustomers to screen out possible criminals and terrorists. 20 The second is to
make available to law enforcement financial information that can be used in
criminal investigations or as evidence in a prosecution. The FATF 40 +
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to maintain records of the
identity of all clients and their transactions. 21 The third is to identify
customers who might be criminals or terrorists so that law enforcement can
decide whether to investigate and prosecute such persons. The FATF 40 +
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to monitor customer
transactions based on their profiles and report to law enforcement those that
raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing are involved.
The US. largely complies with these requirements through
statutory and regulatory measures (although the US does not extend these
requirements to all those designated non-financial businesses and persons as
defined in the Methodology), as well as through guidance issued to financial
institutions. 22 The KU also largely complies through both Directives
20

See infra Part LR2, notes 38-48, and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.B2, notes 49-51, and accompanying text
22 See generally Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2 (requiring U.S. institutions to assist U.S.
government agencies in the detection and preventions of money laundering). See M.
MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31208, INTERNATIONAL MONEY
LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING ACT OF 200l,T!TLE III OF P.L.
107-56 (2001) (providing an overview of the Patriot Act's role in counterterrorism via antimoney laundering efforts); FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORlSM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
83-226 (2006) (describing the laws and regulations in the U.S. pertaining to money laundering and evaluating the quality of these standards) [hereinafter U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT]; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn't Just Watching You, He's Also Wasting Your Tax
Payer Dollars: An Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act,
56 RUTGERS L. REv. 573, 586-7 (2004) (describing the relevant sections of the Patriot Act
and their impact on financial institutions). Regulations on customer identification are found
in 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006). 31 U.S.C. § 5314(b) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
to require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. It is implemented at 21
C.F.R. § 21.110 (2006). There are similar customer identification rules for securities brokerdealers, mutual funds, and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.122 (2006); see also Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering, NOTICE TO MEMBERS No. 02-21, at 5-7
(2002) (providing guidance to financial institutions in the implementation of anti-money
laundering protocol); Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering
Customer Identification Programs for Brokers/Dealers, NoncE TO MEMBERS No. 03-34, at
347 (2003) (notifying members of the implementation of the Patriot Act as pertains to financial institutions). Under 31 C.F.R. § 103.137(c) (2006), a life insurer is required to have
policies and procedures for obtaining "all relevant customer-related information necessary
for an effective anti-money laundering program."
21
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(essentially instructions to members of the Union) and implementing
legislation at the member state level. 23 The language used to implement the
Recommendations is often similar to that found in the Recommendations. 24
2.

Details

FATF Recommendation 5 requires that fmancial institutions
identify their customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer
account, which, in the case of legal persons and other legal arrangements
such as trusts, includes taking "reasonable measures" to identify the
physical persons who own or control the legal person. 25 Recommendation
12 extends these requirements to certain designated non-financial
businesses and persons (known as DNFBPs; for purposes of this Report the
term "fmancial institution" should be read to include DNFBPs), which
include. casinos (which often deal with cash that can be exchanged for chips
and vice versa, providing laundering opportunities), real estate agents (in
part because real estate is often of high value, it is often used as an
investment vehicle by launderers), dealers in precious metals (included for
similar reasons, plus the fact that the ownership of precious metals can be
easily transferred), lawyers, notaries, and persons who assist' in the setting
up of trusts and companies (these are often professionals who assist
launderers in hiding assets). 26 Although neither the Recommendation itself
nor the Methodology uses the term "client profile," Recommendation 5
requires that the fmancial institutions determine the purpose and intended
nature of the business relationship of a potential-and periodically, of a

23
Sorcher, supra note 2 at 408-10 (discussing the various Directives already applied and
the structure of the proposed "Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive").
24 Compare F ATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5 (Recommendation 5 describing the measures to be taken in performing customer due diligence), with Money Laundering
Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, art. 5 (U.K.) (adopting language almost identical to FATF
Recommendation 5 in describing the measures to be taken for customer due diligence). Furthermore, in the course of their assessment work for the IMF and the World Bank, researchers have reviewed implementing statutory and regulatory language in The British Virgin
Islands, Hong Kong, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the U.K. and often
found language nearly identical to that used in the Recommendations and Methodology. This
may be due to decisions to enact the two verbatim so as to ensure that legislation complies
with the standard.
25 FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5-6 (Recommendation 5 requiring customer due-diligence and record-keeping). The Methodology allows an exception from this
latter requirement in the event the legal person is a public company. METHODOLOGY, supra
note 4, at 17-18.
26
FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. Recommendation 22 requires that the
principles applicable to financial institutions also be applied to branches and majority owned
subsidiaries located abroad. I d. at 9.
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current-client and a "knowledge of the customer, their business and risk
profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.'m
This serves two purposes. If a financial institution cannot establish a
potential client's identity and profile, it must terminate the business
relationship. 28 Second, the fmancial institution can measure future
transactions of accepted clients against this baseline of normal or typical
transactions. Specifically, financial institutions must "obtain information on
the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship . . . [and]
conduct ongoing customer due diligence on the business relationship," and
undertake a "scrutiny of transactions under taken throughout the course of
th[ e] relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are
consistent with the institution's knowledge of the customer, its business and
risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds." 29 If the
fmancial institution cannot comply, the financial institution should
terminate business relations or not undertake a transaction. 30 Second, the
client profile allows the financial institutions to monitor client transactions
to see if they are unusual compared with the profile.
A key development in the 2003 Recommendations was the adoption
of an optional risk-based approach for certain preventive measures.
According to the Financial Action Task Force, the adoption of risk
sensitivity "involve[ s] identifying and categorizing money laundering risks
and establishing reasonable controls based on risks identified .... " 31 This
risk-based program, which apparently does not apply to terrorism financing,
contrasts with the previous program, in which each of the FATF
Recommendations was to be implemented objectively regardless of relative
risk levels. 32 FATF Recommendation 5 now allows fmancial institutions to
Id. at 5.
Id. at 9. Recommendation 18 also forbids financial institutions to transact business with
shell banks and "guard against" establishing relations with those that do. Id.
29
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17.
30
!d. at 19. It should also consider filing a suspicious transaction report to the Financial
Intelligence Unit, but is not required to do so. FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at
8.
31
FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 2 (2007) [hereinafter
GUIDANCE ON RBA]. The U.S. has adopted a risk-based system. See FED. FIN. INST.
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION
MANUAL 11-27, I-1, K-1, M-1, M-1-2 (2006) [hereinafter FFIEC MANUAL] (describing
implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act with a risk-based approach).
32
GUIDANCE ON RBA, supra note 31, at 2. According to the F ATF, the new focus on risk
allows financial institutions and supervisory authorities to be more efficient and effective in
their use of resources and minimize burdens on customers, although it does not say exactly
how. Id. During the years when the FATF was considering the adoption of a risk basedapproach disagreement tended to arise at between those FATF delegates from a law enforcement background and those from a regulatory, particularly bank regulatory background,
27

28
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determine the extent of such measures on a risk -sensitive basis, depending
on the type of customer, business relationship, or transaction. 33 Other
Recommendations address new technologies and reliance on third parties
for due diligence. 34
Recommendation 10 requires that financial institutions maintain
customer records, including identification and transaction records sufficient
to permit reconstruction of individual transactions for evidence in a
prosecution, and that these records be maintained for at least five years and
be available for inspection by competent authorities. 35 Special
Recommendation VII provides more detail with respect to wire transfers. 36

with the latter arguing in favor of a risk-based approach. In general, the banking regulators
were used to dealing with concepts of risk while law enforcement was not. "Supervisors
must be satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process (including Board and senior management oversight) to identifY, evaluate,
monitor and control or mitigate all material risks." BASEL CoMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 3 (2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl29.pdf.
33
FA TF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 19. The Methodology goes on to provide
certain examples of higher risk categories. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17. Recommendation 6 singles out a particular category of customers, those individuals who are or have
been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, as well as family members or close associates, which are termed politically-exposed persons. FATF 40
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 22. It requires financial institutions and DNFBP to have
risk management systems to determine if customers are politically-exposed persons and to
take reasonable measures to establish the "source of wealth and source of funds" and to
"conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship." In other words, if a
customer is a politically exposed person the financial institution and certain others must
always take measures to establish the source of funds. Recommendation 6 was added in 2003
to address a perceived public backlash against developed country banks that had laundered
the proceeds of developed country dictators. !d. at 5-6.
34
Under FATF Recommendation 8, "[f]inancial institutions should pay special attention
to any money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies," and
recommends that they have "policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks
associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions." Id. at 6. FATF Recommendation 9 permits financial institutions to rely on third parties to undertake some due
diligence measures in certain cases. !d.
35
Id. at 7. FATF Recommendation 10 also suggests that financial institutions keep and
maintain client account records, and that they "must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of
individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to
provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity." !d. Competent authorities are defined as "all administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing, including the FIU and supervisors."
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 62. An FlU is a financial intelligence unit. !d. at 66.
36
See IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3 (recommending that countries
take actions to enhance their security and gain meaningful originator information for wire
transfers).
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This, along with Recommendation 5, allows investigative and prosecutorial
authorities to "follow the money" of criminal suspects. 37
Recommendation 11 requires that "[f]inancial institutions pay
special attention to complex, unusual large and all unusual patterns of
transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose."38
Financial institutions must examine, "as far as possible," the background
and purpose of such transactions, and establish their fmdings in writing. 39
This requirement is separate from Recommendation 5 's requirement for
ongoing customer due diligence with respect to "scrutiny of transactions." 40
Recommendation 13 requires that a financial institution report promptly to
the governmental Fill if it "suspects" or has "reasonable grounds" to
suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity. 41 The
Methodology describes this as filing an STR. 42 Key to the subject of this
Report, Special Recommendation IV further requires financial institutions
to file reports if they suspect terrorism fmancing. 43
Most jurisdictions provide a template or form for filing STRs (or, in
the U.S., Suspicious Activity Reports: SARs). The U.S. form requires, in
addition to financial institutions, client, and transaction identification
information that a box be checked to characterize the suspicious activity.
Options include "structuring/money laundering" and "terrorism financing,"
as well as various boxes relating to fraud, embezzlement, and identity

37
FA TF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4-5 (proposing identification requirements that will allow institutions and governments to more easily trace accounts). The U.S.
has put in place similar rules. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at 31, 118-22, 261-64 (detailing identification procedures for different types of customers in order to ensure accounts and
transactions are traceable).
38
FA TF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7.
39 !d. at 5, 7 (Recommendations 5 and 10 listing necessary information to be kept on file
and how files should be managed).
40 !d. at 5; see also METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25 ("A fmancial institution should be
required by law or regulation to report to the FlU (a suspicious transaction report-STR)
when it suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity.").
41
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25.
42
!d.

43
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 2. Recommendation 21 requires that
financial institutions and DNFBP pay "special attention" to business relationships and transactions with persons from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FA TF Recommendations (although it does not say how this is to differ from non-special (or average) attention). FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9. This Recommendation raises the
costs of doing business with persons from countries that do not sufficiently apply the Recommendations as a whole. This creates a financial incentive for countries to implement the
Recommendations, especially as detemuned by assessment reports. !d.
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theft. 44 Also required is a narrative description of the suspected violation,
including what is unusual, irregular, and suspicious about the reported
transaction. 45
It is these Recommendations, along with Recommendation 5, that
create the system requiring financial institutions to monitor customer
transactions based on their profiles and to report to law enforcement those
that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing might be
involved. Recommendation 15 requires financial institutions to develop
internal policies, procedures, and controls for anti-money laundering
programs, including compliance management arrangements, internal training, and audit capacities. 46 Recommendation 16 extends most of these
requirements to the same designated non-financial businesses and persons
as found in Recommendation 12, although not all. 47
An essential aspect of this part of the preventive measures system
should be emphasized. Financial institutions must design and implement
their own systems. 48 While the five-part requirement describes what these
44
FinCEN, Suspicious Activity Report, Part III (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fin
cen.gov/forms/files/f9022-4 7_ sar-di.pdf.
45
!d. Part V.
46
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
47
!d. at 8. Recommendation 14 protects financial institutions from any liability for filing
suspicious activities reports and prohibits the reporting person from revealing that such reports are being made (known as the prohibition against tipping off). U.S. rules comply with
these requirements, except that DNFBP include casinos only. See 31 C.F .R. § 103.18-19
(2006) (describing the types of transactions that require reporting, including funds derived
from illegal activity or transactions that have no business or apparent lawful purpose).
48
See, e.g., FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4 (Recommendation 5 stating:
"[f]inancial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures ... but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 5
(Recommendation 6 stating that financial systems should "[h)ave appropriate risk management systems ... .")(emphasis added); id. at 6 (Recommendation 8 stating: "financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated
with non-face to face business relationships or transactions") (emphasis added); id. at 6
(Recommendation 9 stating: "[a] financial institution should satisfY itself that the third party
is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with [customer due
diligence requirements] in line with Recommendations 5 and 10.") (emphasis added); id. at 7
(Recommendation 10 stating: "records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.") (emphasis added); id.
("Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions .... The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be
examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities
and auditors.") (emphasis added); id. at 8 (Recommendation 13 stating: "[i]f a financial
institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a
criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing it should be required to report promptly
its suspicions. . . .") (emphasis added); id. ("[ f]inancial institutions should develop programDs against money laundering and terrorist financing ... [including] [t]he development

2012]

TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS

779

systems are supposed to accomplish, it does not provide any detail as to
how they are supposed to do it. Financial institutions are not told how to
implement those requirements. An exception to this is Recommendation 25,
which requires that government authorities establish guidelines and provide
feedback to assist financial institutions and others subject to preventive
measures, "in particular m detecting and reporting susp1c10us
transactions. " 49
Neither compliance reports nor sanctions reported by supervisory
authorities discuss in any detail the design of compliance systems. 50
Financial institutions also do not publicize exactly how they implement
these requirements. 51 Clearly, monitoring of transactions to determine if
they vary from the expected client profile is the first key. Such monitoring
appears to be based first, as required by Recommendation 11, on whether a
transaction (or series of transactions) differs in magnitude from that
normally expected of the client, based on the client's profile. Further
scrutiny of the transaction can determine if something else appears unusual,
such as an unusual transferor or transferee.
One aspect of successful transaction analysis is link analysis, a
technique used to find associations within data that might have relevance to
the particular research question. 52 Link analysis explores associations within
collections of data. 53 Increasing the number of data sets available increases
the number and types of links that can be identified. There are a number of
different types of data sets that could be helpful in money laundering or
terrorism financing link analysis. First, personal and financial data
(including personal and businesses names, addresses, phone numbers,
of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate compliance management
arrangements ....") (emphasis added).
49
!d. at 10.
50
See id. (Recommendation 25 stating only that guidelines should be established, not what
those guidelines should be).
51
An important barrier to learning more about how firms actually implement their preventive measures is a desire for protecting proprietary information in the context of competitive
concerns, something researchers have learned from numerous interviews conducted with
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S., Hong Kong, The British Virgin Islands, and the Philippines over the past five years. See Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and
Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF): Case Study, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc.
com/lu/en/anti-money-laundering/case.jhtml (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing almost
no detail on a preventive measures system recommended by an outside consultant).
52
Cuellar, supra note 2, at 368-69.
53
FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING
SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 10 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news
_room/rp/files/CBFTFS _ Complete.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC
FUNDS]; see also Cuellar, supra note 2, at 368-69. Much of the infonnation in the following
two paragraphs of text has been provided by Boudewijn Verhelst. Verhe!st e-mail, supra
note 13.
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names of beneficial owners and controllers, bank accounts, deposits, funds
transfers) would link people and businesses through their financial
transactions. For example, this can establish that person A has a relationship
with company B and person C.
Next, descriptive links can be established with databases that
describe the type of business activities normally conducted by the persons
within the link. Such data includes customer identification/profiles and
other information such as that which is found in business directories like
Dunn and Bradstreet. Links can also be made to data that include money
laundering or terrorism financing indicators, such as law enforcement data,
case files, or STRs, can also be made.
Once such descriptive links are established, further analysis can
help determine if a transaction between identified persons looks unusual or
suspicious. For example, if person A has a terrorism-related record or has
made past suspicious transactions, payments to company B or C could raise
suspicion that payments might be related to terrorism financing. This
suspicion could be raised further if person A owns or controls company B
and company B itself has no known business, and if B itself is located in a
jurisdiction where terrorism is known to be active. If C has a record as a
terrorist or terrorist organization, a stronger suspicion might be raised that
the payments were made to fmance terrorism. Obviously, the greater the
amount of relevant data and data types, the more extensive will be the link
analysis. However, financial institutions and DNFBPs are restricted in their
access to some useful data sets.
Such use of descriptive links and analysis is also described as data
mining and the use of red flags. 54 Such "red flags" or "indicators" are based
on laundering or terrorism financing typologies. Such typologies are those
typically provided by the FATF or local competent authorities (sometimes,
they result from international financial institutions' own FIU efforts).
Without such typologies it is difficult for financial institutions to know if a
transaction or series of transaction is, in fact, an indicator of laundering or
terrorism financing.
Some financial institutions contract out some of their customer
identification and client monitoring programs to third-party service
providers. A review of some of their programs provides some insight into
services offered. For example, some firms assist in customer identification
and profiling by providing a risk-screening service to check individual or
entity names against a comprehensive data set. 55 Firms can also supply

54
G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan & Subhrangshu Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Combat Money Laundering, Part 2, INFO. MGMT. (Oct. 1, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.infor
mation-management.com/specialreports/20071 009/1 093416-l.html?zkPrintable=true.
55
E.g., WORLD-CHECK ONLINE, http://www.world-check.com/ (last visited May 22, 2012).
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transaction monitoring services. One firm "monitors and detects" suspicious
transactions "across all business lines" using "a fuily integrated dynamic
and adaptive multidimensional intelligent engine [which] detects suspicious
activities."56 This is accomplished using "risk modeling" and "risk-based
algorithms" to "analyze and investigate suspicious activities effectively and
efficiently."57 Presumably, they use link analysis combined with red-flag
analysis to help determine which transactions warrant the filing of a report.
C.

Public Sector Role

Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 32 (and the relevant
materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance)
address both the supervisory system-to ensure private sector compliance
with its preventive measures requirements-and the criminal investigation
and prosecution system for state law enforcement authorities. 58 The public
sector's role focuses on three basic objectives. The first objective is to
ensure the private sector's compliance with their preventive measure
responsibilities. Essentially, governmental authorities must supervise and
regulate financial institutions to ensure compliance. This must include both
guidance and examination functions, including the potential application of
sanctions. The second objective is to ensure that STRs lead to the
investigation of appropriate cases of suspected crime and terrorism.
Essentially, a FIU receives and analyzes these reports along with other key
information. It then decides which should be further investigated, and it
forwards them to the appropriate government agency (typically the police).
The FIU then decides, sometimes in consultation with state prosecutors,
whether and how to go forward.
Recommendation 25 requires that government authorities establish
guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions "in detecting
and reporting suspicious transactions." 59 The Methodology goes further by
56
Press Release, GlobalVision Systems, Inc., American Bankers Association Endorses
PATRIOT OFFICER® as #1 AML/BSA Solution (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.gv-systems.
com/20 10/06/08/american -bankers-association-endorses-patriot-officer%C2%AE-as-1-amlbs
a-solution/ [hereinafter ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®]. See generally PATRIOT
OFF!CER®for Banks, GLOBALVISION SYSTEMS, INC., http://www.gv-systems.com/productssolutions/patriot-officer-for-banks/ (last visited June 11, 2012) (providing anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing monitoring software designed to comply with the USA
Patriot Act and other anti-laundering regulations).
57
ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®, supra note 56.
58
Recommendations 18 and 19 are listed under the preventive measures section of the
FATF Recommendations; 26 through 32 are under "C. Institutional and Other Measures
Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Competent
authorities, Their Powers and Resources." FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 911.
59
!d. at 10.
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stating that authorities should provide a description of money-laundering
and terrorism-financing techniques and methods and any additional
measures to ensure that the systems are implemented by financial
institutions. 60 This includes information on current techniques, methods and
trends (typologies); 61 examples of actual money laundering cases; and caseby-case feedback, including if an STR was found to relate to a legitimate
transaction.
In order to ensure compliance with the preventive measures,
Recommendation 23 requires that financial institutions be subject to
adequate regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of the
preventive measures, 62 while Recommendations 29 and 17 require that
supervisors have adequate powers to ensure compliance including the
imposition of sanctions. 63 Recommendation 26 requires that countries
establish an FIU64 to serve as a national center for the receipt, analysis, and
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 33.
See Methods and Trends, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/ (last
visited May 22, 2012).
60

61

The methods used for laundering money and the fmancing of terrorism are in constant evolution. As the international financial sector implements the FATF standards, criminals must find alternative channels to launder proceeds of criminal activities and finance illicit activities. The FATF identifies new threats and researches
money laundering and terrorist financing methods. FATF Typologies reports describe and explain their nature, thus increasing global awareness and allowing for
earlier detection.
I d.
62
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9-10. Recommendation 24 extends this
requirement to designated non-financial businesses and persons. I d. at 10.
63
Id. at 9, 11. U.S. laws also comply with these requirements. See 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2004)
(addressing "financial recordkeeping and reporting of currency and foreign transactions");
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (1980) (requiring recordkeeping of financial transactions).
The U.S. has levied significant fines, as well as other supervisory and regulatory orders,
against financial institutions and casinos. See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the
Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1361, 1414-15 (2007).

Since September 11, FinCEN has imposed a staggering number of fines on banks
for failing to meet its reporting requirements. Moreover, those fines have been extraordinarily large. ABN AMRO, a large European bank, has been hit with a $30
million fine (and more from state regulators). Western Union has also been hit with
a $30 million fine for its record-keeping failures. And the Department of Justice
has brought criminal prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which resulted in a $50 million civil monetary penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in
combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank, which put the bank out of
business.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64
FATF 40 REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10-11. The line between what some
countries formally refer to as their financial intelligence unit and other law enforcement
agencies is often blurry. This Report refers to the financial intelligence unit using a function-

2012]

TERRORJSM FINANCING INDICATORS

783

dissemination of STRs and other information regarding potential money
laundering or terrorist financing. It further states that the FlU should have
timely access, directly or indirectly, to the financial, administrative, and
law-enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its
functions, including the analysis of STRs. 65 Recommendation 10 states that
competent authorities (including Fills) should have access to records kept
by financial institutions and DNFBPs. 66 Finally, Recommendation 40 states
that countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the
widest possible range of international cooperation to their foreign
counterparts, including information relating to money laundering, provided
that controls and safeguards are in place to ensure that information
exchanged is used only in a manner consistent with obligations concerning
privacy and data protection. 67 The Methodology further states that Fills
should be authorized to allow foreign intelligence units to search their own
databases, including law enforcement databases, subject to confidentiality
safeguards limiting the use of the data. 68 This is the only substantive
Recommendation relating to FIUs. 69
al definition. See What is an FJU?, THE EGMONT GROUP FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS,
http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/what-is-an-fiu (last visited May 22, 2012) (describing the
different types of FlUs); The Egmont Group, The Egmont Definition of a Financial Intelligence Unit 1-2 (interpretive note, last visited May 22, 2012), available at http://www.eg
montgroup.org/library/dowuload/8 (providing a functional definition of FlU not cabined to
any particular sort oflaw enforcement).
65
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10-11. For example, FinCEN has access
to numerous databases. These include several databases of criminal reports sourced from the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's TECS II system, the FBI's National Criminal
Information Center, the Drug Enforcement Administration's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Information and NDIC Systems, the U.S. Secret Service database, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. It also has access to the Office of Foreign Assets Control's list of Specially
Designated Nationals, the Social Security Administration's Death Master File, and the State
Department's list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also has access to commercial database services from organizations such as Dun & Bradstreet, LEXIS/NEXIS, and
credit bureaus as well as commercially available lists of "Politically Exposed Persons." FinCEN also maintains its owu database of investigations and queries conducted through FinCEN's systems. FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS, supra note 53, at 9-10.
66
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7.
67
Jd.at13-14.
68
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 46.
69
See generally FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 13. The draft methodology
included a significant number of criteria spelling out in detail the duties of financial intelligence units, including most of those described in infra notes and accompanying text. However, during a meeting in Basel in February, 2002 representatives of the Egmont Group, an
informal association of financial intelligence units, objected to the spelling out in such detail
of the purposes and activities of FIUs because of the difficulty of finding consensus on such
a large amount of detail from such a large group. Nevertheless, the representatives largely
concmTed that the criteria in the methodology described an effective financial intelligence
unit. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 38 (2002). The U.S. largely complies with these re-

784

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 44:765

Dividing the task of determining suspicious and really suspicious
transactions between the private sector and public FlUs usually begins with
the receipt of an STR, after which the FlU engages in a two-part analysis. In
the first part, known as "tactical analysis," the FlU looks for additional
information on the persons and transactions involved or other elements
involved in a particular case to provide the basis for further analysis. 70 A
key element of such tactical analysis is link analysis, which has been
discussed at length above in the context of transaction monitoring and
suspicious transaction reporting. Financial intelligence units typically have
available various types of data, including those publicly available databases
to which the private sector has access. An FlU can also have access to
nonpublic databases such as tax records, police records, immigration and
customs records, vehicle registries, and supervisory fmdings, as well as
investigation reports for ongoing investigations, criminal records (which are
nonpublic in many countries), currency transaction reports, currency and
monetary instrument reports, and related-party data (same address or
telephone number, known associates, etc.). 71
Following tactical link analysis, the FlU typically undertakes
operational analysis. Operational analysis uses tactical information to
formulate different hypotheses on the possible activities of the suspect to
produce operational intelligence for use by investigators. It uses:
[A]11 sources of information available to the FlU to produce activity
patterns, new targets, relationships among the subject and his or her
accomplices, investigative leads, criminal profiles, and-where possibleindications of possible future behavior. One of the techniques of
operational analysis used in some FlUs is financial profiling. 72

Based on such analysis, the FlU may or may not disseminate a report for
further investigation. 73 In recommending an SAR for further investigation,
FlUs may include a description of what they had learned from these
different types of analysis. This is often called "actionable intelligence" that
can assist law enforcement in conducting a further investigation.
Another important function of the FlU is strategic analysis, or the
development of relevant knowledge on laundering or terrorism-fmancing
techniques. Examples include the identification of evolving criminal
patterns in a particular group or the provision of broad insights into
quirements. See U.S. MUTUAL EvALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 226-40 (describing the
U.S.laws that fulfill FlU obligations).
70 See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-5-6 (describing the analytical role of FlUs); see also
IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 57-58 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, FlUs].
71
Verhelst e-mail, supra note 13.
72 IMF, FlUs, supra note 70, at 60.
73 Id. at61.
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emerging patterns of criminality, including transactions particular to a given
group, ideology or geographic location. 74 The Fill can then use these for its
own operational analysis of STRs through linking as well as to develop
guidelines, typologies etc. for use by financial institutions. 75 This generally
follows the system used by FinCEN in the U.S. 76
II. DETECTION OF TERRORISM FINANCING

A.

Overview

As discussed above, the FATF adopted the Special
Recommendations in November, 2001, after the previous month's terrorist
attacks against the U.S. However, that the financing of terrorism should be
so closely tied to anti-money laundering was by no means completely
obvious. While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the original FATF 40
made no reference to it. Anti-money laundering laws were designed to stop
criminals from taking criminal proceeds and running them through the
financial system in a series of transactions to hide their criminal origins
and/or actual ownership. On the other hand, terrorism financing need not
involve criminal origins but only a particular type of criminal destination:
terrorism.
Of course, there were some obvious connections. As discussed
above, identifying the financial institution's clients was a key aspect of antimoney laundering preventive measures. These measures could also be used
to identify whether the client was a terrorist, provided of course that the
financial institution or the authorities knew who the terrorists were. This
proved to be a valuable avenue for combating terrorism-financing measures.
Before the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council had passed resolutions
requiring all states to freeze accounts held by members of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban and had set up the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. 77
The Committee created a consolidated list of entities and officials
associated with these organizations, as submitted by members. Subsequent

74
See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3 (discussing definitions ofFIUs that emphasis specificity to each nation's needs and characteristics); see also IMF, FIUs, supra note 70, at 59-60
(noting that unusual transactions develop the basis for further investigation by the financial
intelligence units).
75
IMF, FlUs, supra note 70, at 60.
76
See generally U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 126-36 (discussing
record keeping rules for the banking, securities, insurance, and money services business
sectors to combat money laundering and requirements to report unusual, suspicious transactions).
77
S.C. Res. 1267, 'lf4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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resolutions strengthened this original commitment-18 Resolution 13 73passed as a result of the 9/11 attacks-extended the requirement of states to
freeze accounts to terrorists other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 79 The
General Assembly had also adopted a Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism Financing, although it did not go into force until April, 2002. 80
The convention requires contracting states to take appropriate measures "for
the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or
allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist offenses as defined in the
convention] as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for
purposes of possible forfeiture." 81
Assuming that someone could come up with a list of possible
terrorists, fmancial institutions could compare that list to their account
holders to see ifthere was a match, much as they could now do with known
criminals. However, as discussed above, the new anti-terrorism fmancing
regime required fmancial institutions to profile clients and monitor
transactions to see if they might have some involvement in the financing of
terrorism, and to report those cases as well. When the FATF first published
its 40 Recommendations, fmancial institutions in .most F ATF member
countries were in the process of implementing a client identification-,
78
ld ~ 6; see also Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and
1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, U.N. SECURITY
CoUNCIL, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ (last visited May 22, 2012) (explaining
subsequent resolutions modified and strengthened policies by designating sanction measures
to specific individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaeda).
79
S.C. Res. 1373, ~ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
80 See generally International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Convention]
(prohibiting the financing of terrorism).
81
/d. art 8. The Treaty defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and:

Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.

Id art. 2(1 )(b). The treaties listed in the Annex include unlawful seizure of aircraft, unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons (including diplomatic agents), the taking of hostages, the unlawful acquisition or threat to nuclear material, unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation and
against the safety of civil aviation, unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation,
unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf, and terrorist bombings. ld Annex; see also G.A. Res. 164, Annex, U.N. Doc A/52/164 (Jan. 9,
1998) (attaching the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings for
adoption by the General Assembly). With certain limited exceptions in each convention, the
terrorists must be nationals of a different state than the state in which the terrorist act took
place. See Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 80, art. 3; see also G.A. Res.
164, supra note 81, annex, art. 2.
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subsequent resolutions modified and strengthened policies by designating sanction measures
to specific individuals and entities associated with AI-Qaeda).
79
S.C. Res. 1373, 'Ill, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
80
See generally International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Convention]
(prohibiting the financing of terrorism).
R!
Id. art 8. The Treaty defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and:
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profiling-, monitoring-, and STR-reporting system for criminal proceeds
reflecting the system required by the FATF 40. But when the system was
extended to terrorism financing, neither financial institutions nor their
supervisors had much, if any, relevant experience. While they had not
originally been in the business of finding criminal proceeds, at least
financial institutions had years of learning how to do so, as well as
considerable typology guidance from competent authorities, the FATF, and
FSRBs.

B.

Terrorism Typologies/Indicators/Red Flags

As discussed above, financial institutions implement their STRreporting requirements by, among other things, identifying clients
(including determining exactly who they really are), creating client profiles,
monitoring client transactions with respect to those profiles to identify large
or unusual transactions, performing link analysis, and comparing
transactions to known typologies of money laundering and terrorism to see
if any red flags are raised.
Such typologies are provided by domestic competent authorities, as
well as by the FATF or FSRBs. But what are those terrorism typologies,
indicators and red flags?
Soon after the FATF adopted the Special Recommendations, the
FATF Secretariat published Guidance for Financial Institutions in
Detecting Terrorist Financing, stating that that "[i]t should be
acknowledged ... that financial institutions will probably be unable to detect
terrorist financing as such." 82 While there was mention of charities as being
of special concern, there was no attempt to tie these to any special type of
charity, or to charities sending payments to locations known to have
terrorism concerns. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
U.S.'s Staff Report on Terrorist Financing, published two years after the
adoption of the Special IV, concluded that:
[Financial institutions] can be most useful in the fight against terrorist
financing by collecting accurate information about their customers and
providing this information . . . to aid in terrorism investigations. . . .
However, the requirement that financial institutions file SARs does not
work very well to detect or prevent terrorist financing, for there is a
fundamental distinction between money laundering and terrorist financing.

82

FATF, GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN DETECTING TERRORIST FINANCING

(2002).
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Financial institutions have the information and expertise to detect the one
but not the other. 83

In its sixth report, the U.N. Security Council's Monitoring Team
was not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of preventive measures in
deterring terrorism financing, in part because of lack of guidance. "The
volume of suspicious transaction reports has increased tremendously,
though the procedure suffers from a lack of guidance as to what to look for.
... Only a small proportion of the reports are related to terrorist financing
and hardly any have been associated with Al-Qaida. " 84
Early in 2008, the F ATF released its most comprehensive report to
date on terrorist financing. 85 The Report stated that "[d]espite the challenge
in developing generic indicators of terrorist financing activity financial
institutions may nevertheless identify unusual characteristics about a
transaction that should prompt the filing of a suspicious transaction
report." 86 However, the cases and examples dealt almost entirely with
individuals or organizations identified as having terrorism connections
rather than through terrorism financing indicators (including "media
coverage of account holder's activities," 87 presumably when the media
reveals that someone may be connected to terrorism in some way). The only
uniquely terrorism financing indicators noted in the Report were charity and
relief organizations sending to or receiving funds from "locations of specific
concern."
While there has so far been relatively little guidance to financial
institutions as to indicators or typologies of greater risk of terrorism
financing, they are still required to implement Special IV, VI, and VII.
Anecdotal evidence gathered largely from . informal interviews with
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S. has indicated that at
least some financial institutions have implemented "defensive" systems
based largely on whether a client or potential client is a charity that makes
payments to charities based in terrorism "hot spots;" this includes not
accepting the charity as a client or filing STRs after a charity makes any
83
JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG, & SERENA WILLE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING,
STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 52-54 (2004).
84
Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team, transmitted by
letter dated Mar. 8, 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established
pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) concerning AI-Qaeda and the Taliban
and associated individuals and entities, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/2007/132 (Mar. 8, 2007).

85
See generally F ATF, TERRORIST FINANCING (2008) (exploring issues of terrorist requirements for fund, how terrorists raise and move fund, and the international response to
terrorist financing).
86
87

I d. at 29.
!d. at31.
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large transaction. If true, this would not only raise costs to financial
institutions, but would also reduce financial services to needy clients. It
would also suggest that financial institutions' STRs included at least a high
number of false positives (and perhaps a high number of false negatives),
which would raise costs to PIUs and law enforcement without improving
capacity to deter or prevent terrorism financing.
III. STUDY TO IDENTIFY TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS

A.

Overview

This preliminary study on terrorism-related prosecutions in the U.S.
was completed by Professor Richard Gordon of the Case Western Reserve
University, with assistance from students at Case Western. It is to be used in
the completion of a final report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern
University and the Honorable Susan Eckert of Brown University, which will
include cases from other jurisdictions, additional analytical discussion, and
bibliographical material.
The objective of the U.S. study is to identify red flags or indicators
of terrorism that financial institutions can use in implementing their duties
to monitor client transactions and report those that raise a suspicion of
terrorism fmancing. The study research methodology included five steps:
(1) We selected terrorism cases that were successfully prosecuted.
(2) We examined those cases to determine which involved a
transaction though a regulated financial institution, and we
collected the relevant client identification, profiling, and
transaction data.
(3) We examined the data to identify any possible indicators of
terrorism financing.
(4) We determined if any SARs were filed by financial institutions
with respect to those transactions. We reviewed the SARs to see
why they were filed, including by examining the SAR narrative
to determine what, if any, additional information the reporting
institution had uncovered.
(5) Finally, we determined if FinCEN had referred the SAR for
further investigation.
While it was relatively easy to complete steps 1 and 2, difficulties
arose with completing the other steps. In particular, with respect to step 3 it
proved difficult to acquire actual records of most of the identified
transactions and impossible to acquire client identifying and profiling
information, although in a number of cases it proved possible to acquire
sufficient descriptive information to make some tentative conclusions about
possible indicators. With respect to step 4, while research was continuing,
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FinCEN proposed a new regulation (which became final in December 2010)
that changed previous law, which had permitted a financial institution to
release an SAR, provided that it did not "tip off' persons involved in the
suspicious transaction. (This would have been an impossibility in the cases
we were reviewing because all the persons had already been prosecuted.)
The new regulation made step 5 in our methodology impossible to
implement.
As a result, the findings of this study are more tentative than was
expected at the outset. However, the study suggests some alternatives that
might be pursued that could help rectify the deficiencies in the current study
that arose due to the inability to implement steps 4 and 5.

B.

Steps 1 & 2: Terrorism Case Selection, Identification of those
Involving Financial Transactions and Collection of Transaction
Records

In December, 2008, Jeffrey Breinholt88 of the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) provided the project with a list of 230 U.S. cases that he, in
consultation with and other DOJ officials had identified as involving a
prosecution in which the U.S. alleged that the defendants(s) may have been
involved in supporting terrorism or some form of terrorist activity. 89 This
list did not include the 9/11 case, which had been reviewed extensively by
the U.S. 9/11 Commission and which did not tum up any apparent
terrorism-financing indicators. This list was supplemented in October, 2010
with an additional thirty-three cases to bring the list up-to-date.
By reviewing DOJ press releases, news stories, and published court
opinions, researchers identified forty-seven cases as possibly involving
terrorism financing. Each involved either deposit-taking institutions or
money-transfer agents. Researchers then collected and reviewed relevant
court documents that were either published or made available free of charge
through the Internet. These often included pleadings and motions, including
bills of indictment and requests for warrants, freezing orders, material
witness orders, and supporting affidavits. On rare occasions, some evidence
submitted during the trial was also located and reviewed. Of considerable
help to locating such materials is The Nine Eleven Finding Answers
Foundation (NEFA), which maintains a website that includes many
publically available documents on terrorism-related criminal and civil
88
Mr. Breinholt has been Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Section and Coordinator, Terrorist Financing Task Force of the U.S. Department of Justice.
89
In many of the prosecutions, charges were not brought for either terrorism or material
support, but in all instances charges were brought for some other offence, including: making
false statements; immigration fraud; money laundering (including structuring or operation or
use of unlicensed MSBs); threats other than terrorist threats; hoaxes; and air violence. Material witness orders that involved no criminal charge were also included.
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cases. 9° From the group of forty-seven, researchers identified thirty that
might involve both terrorism financing and a regulated financial institution.
For these cases, researchers attempted to collect and examine documents
and evidence not published or available for free on the internet.
Researchers first attempted to obtain copies of client identification,
profiling information, and transaction records from the banks and transfer
agents in question. However, these reporting persons refused to share such
records, citing the expense involved in collecting and providing us with
such information and the concern that doing so might breach FinCEN's
SAR confidentiality rules. 91 They made this later point even though we did
not mention SARs themselves and even though no law or regulation made
reference to the confidentiality of information that may have given rise to
the filing of an SAR.
Failing in this attempt, researchers then turned to records made
available as evidence in prosecution of the terrorism cases. In theory, all
publicly available case documents, including all evidence submitted for
trial, can be obtained in two ways: (1) in hard copy from the relevant court
(mostly for cases that are older than ten years); or (2) through the online
federal court filing and retrieval system known as PACER. However, in
many cases the number of pages of documents filed from beginning to end
run to the tens of thousands. The court keeps a docket of filings for each
case, but the docket entries themselves rarely identify exactly what kind of
evidence, if any, is included in the filing. As a result, it becomes necessary
to individually examine documents to identify those that relate to fmancial
transactions. For documents filed with the court in hard copy, this requires
physically visiting the court, requesting documents from the court clerk, and
reviewing them on-site. For most relevant documents filed through PACER,
this requires downloading each page at a cost of$ 0.10 per page.
After attempting and failing to identify relevant documents by
reviewing court dockets filed on PACER, researchers contacted via e-mail
and telephone 92 those DOJ personnel who prosecuted each case for
assistance identifying relevant documents. Follow-up e-mails and telephone
calls were made where appropriate. Prosecutors had to divert their time
from other pressing work to assist researchers with work that would not (at

90 See Featured Legal Cases, NINE ELEVEN FINDING ANSWERS [NEFA] FOUNDATION,
http://nefafoundation.org//index.cfm?pageiD=29 (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing a
portal to domestic criminal and civil and international cases on terrorism).
91
Given the nature of the refusals given by the first few approached, researchers gave up
without pursuing the rest, deeming any additional efforts to be pointless.
92
Each e-mail described the nature and purpose of the project, summarized the available
details of the case, and requested any information regarding financial transactions, especially
PACER document numbers.
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least directly) assist in the prosecution of cases, current or future. 93 Not
surprisingly, in many instances prosecutors were not able to respond to
requests for assistance. 94 In many instances, prosecutors informed us that for
various reasons (including decisions not to charge defendants with crimes
requiring financial transaction evidence or the entrance of guilty pleas to
such crimes prior to the introduction of evidence) no relevant documents
were admitted into evidence, and therefore they could not be shared with
researchers. As a result, only in a few cases have prosecutors been able to
share with researchers actual documentary evidence of financial
transactions. In those instances, however, thousands of pages representing
tens of thousands of transactions have been provided.
Of those thirty cases, researchers found sufficient fmancial
information to draw conclusions in twenty-four. A description of these
cases, and of the relevant information obtained with respect to financial
transactions are included in the Annex.
C.

Step 3: Analysis ofTransactionsfor Indicators

As discussed above, in order to determine if a transaction is
suspicious it is necessary for the financial institution to identify and profile
the client, to monitor the client's transactions, and to examine transactions.
However, in the initial review of the thirty cases for evidence of suspicious
transactions, it was not possible to consult client identification and profiling
information. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of instances it was possible
to take educated guesses, based on publicly available information
concerning the client in question, to determine if payments would fit an
assumed client profile as being legitimate. This is because most transactions
fall into three types: (1) those that are too small to be consequential; (2)
those that are consequential but that appear to be between individuals or
entities with no obvious legitimate connection that would render the
transaction suspicious; and (3) those that appear to be between individuals
or entities with a legitimate reason to make the transaction.

93
Case Western Reserve University researchers discussed this matter with a number of
prosecutors. Some noted that while the results of our research project might help future financial institution compliance officers and/or investigators in identifying terrorism financing
suspects, the results would be unlikely to help those who ultimately prosecuted those cases.
Some also suggested that they believed that, from their experience, there were no "terrorism
indicators," and that the project was unlikely to be of any assistance to law enforcement.
94
In a few instances prosecutors had left the DOJ for private practice. In these cases they
did respond to e-mail inquiries but were unable to assist in finding relevant documents.
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Step 4: Review any SARs Filed

As discussed above, part of a reporting institution's preventive
measures obligation is to examine any unusual transaction to determine if
there is an actual suspicion that it concerns terrorism financing. Because the
methods by which reporting persons implement these requirements are
expensive and proprietary, they are understandably reticent to share any
details. We sought instead to obtain copies of any SARs filed so that we
could examine the narratives and determine if link analysis, reference to any
publically available information on the clients, or typologies might have
played a role in uncovering relevant indicator information. We were not
successful.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
states that "[t]he global war on terrorism and cutting off terrorist financing
is a policy priority for the U.S. and its partners, working bilaterally and
multilaterally through the U.N., the U.N. Security Council and its
committees ... and other multilateral fora." 95 Under § 5318(g) of the USA
Patriot Act, 96 a fmancial institution and its agents are prohibited from
notifying any person who is the subject of an SAR either that an SAR was
filed or of the circumstances surrounding the filing. Congress apparently
included this provision in order to prevent the tipping off of launderers and
terrorists, which could spoil any current or future investigation. There was,
however, no prohibition on release of information that an SAR had been
filed or of the SAR itself that applied to government authorities. The
implementing regulations essentially restated the statutory language. 97 Also,
courts had held that SARs were not strictly confidential and that disclosure
of an SAR in a case where the subject of the report has already been
convicted will not compromise an ongoing law enforcement investigation,
or provide information to a criminal wishing to evade detection. 98 This was
clearly the situation with respect to the cases we were investigating.
Based on such policy, law, and precedent, researchers requested
copies from the DOJ of any SARs filed with respect to the thirty cases that
we had identified, but with any information concerning innocent persons
redacted. Officials at the DOJ were sympathetic and prepared to release
95
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §
7701, 118 Stat. 3638, 3858 (2004).
96
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A) (2006).
97
See 12 C.F.R. § 21.1l(k) (2011) (providing similar guidance in the administrative regulation as in the enacting legislation).
98
See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (noting
that SAR disclosure poses a threat when a suspect is still at large); see also BizCapital &
Indus. Corp. v. Comptroller of Currency, 467 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that
SARs are not categorically privileged under certain circumstances).
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redacted SARs to researchers, but then FinCEN issued a new regulation that
prohibits private or public sector persons from revealing if an SAR was
filed, or any contents of that SAR, to anyone in any circumstances. 99 While
there appears to be no statutory authority for such a regulation (and
therefore that it may be ultra vires, the statute may therefore be invalid), its
issuance prevented DOJ from releasing any redacted SARs to researchers.
Because we were unable to review the SARs, it was impossible for
researchers to obtain the information necessary to determine if financial
institutions had in fact used their knowledge of customer information,
customer transactions, and link analysis, typologies, etc. to conclude that a
transaction was suspicious. It also made it impossible for researchers to
determine ifFinCEN had referred such SARs to law enforcement for further
investigation, or if they had added actionable intelligence to the SARs that
would suggest either money laundering or terrorism fmancing.

E.

Response to New Regulation Preventing Implementation of Step 4

While the new Regulation prevents both public and private sectors
from revealing if SARs have been filed or the contents of those SARs, it
also made clear that "[w]ith respect to the SAR confidentiality provisions
only, institutions may disclose underlying facts, transactions, and
documents for any purpose, provided that no person involved in the
transaction is notified and none of the underlying information reveals the
existence of an SAR." 10° For this reason, fmancial institutions should no
longer be concerned with SAR confidentiality issues, and they should only
be concerned about the costs of releasing identification, profiling, and
transaction documents. Financial institutions may, however, continue to be
reticent about releasing any link analysis that might lead a reviewer to
believe that an SAR had, in fact, been filed.
In order to encourage reporting persons to release identification,
profiling and transaction data with respect to the identified cases,
researchers have approached a number of financial institutions and
requested that they create a committee to assist the Counterterrorism Task
Force in identifying terrorism fmancing methodologies (CACTF). The
Committee would encourage reporting persons in question to release the
relevant documents, and it would provide technical assistance where
needed. We expect CACTF to be up and running by End May, 2011.

99 See FinCEN; Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75 Fed. Reg. 75593,
75598 (Dec. 3, 2010) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. § 103) (explaining exceptions for connected parties and certain other government officials).
100 I d. (citations omitted).

)
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New Step 5: Review Documents released by Reporting Persons

Researchers are working with the initial members of CACTF to
plan a workshop sometime in the fall of 2011 to review any released
documents. The workshop will include AMLICFT compliance officers from
member banks. It is hoped that this conference will help deepen our
understanding of the nature of the cases identified in this Report.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Based on assumptions concerning client identification and profiles,
researchers examined transactions to determine if there was anything
unusual in those transactions that would raise a suspicion of terrorism
financing. In doing so, we did not indicate instances where a person was
identifiable as a terrorist or terrorist organization, in that this was not an
"indicator" but a fact.
In the twenty-four cases where sufficient financial information was
available to draw a conclusion, fourteen indicated instances of classic
money laundering typologies, including placement, layering, integration, or
an unlicensed money service business. Only three of these cases involved
criminal proceeds, although an additional three appear to involve diversion
of charitable donations to terrorists which could have, in effect, constituted
theft of legitimate donations. In eight cases there was no suspicious
transaction of any kind (other than a party to a transaction was a known
terrorist), although in two of these, criminal proceeds were involved. Only
one indicated a possible set of transactions that might be a unique indicator
for terrorism financing.
Terrorist financers appear to be using classic money laundering
typologies regardless of whether they are trying to launder the proceeds of
crime. It appears that they do so either to hide the origins of the funds or the
recipient of the funds without leaving a directly traceable transaction
between origin and recipient. In other words, they are acting in a fashion
similar to that of former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, who used classic
structuring transactions to hide that he was making payments to
prostitutes. 101
Therefore, simply by using standard anti-money laundering
typologies financial institutions should have been able to identifY fourteen
of the twenty-four instances of terrorism financing as being suspicious,
though not on their face to raise suspicion of terrorism financing. What we
can tell from examining the cases is that it might have been possible for the
101
See generally Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?, supra note 1 (explaining how SARs exposed governor Eliot Spitzer's political scandal involving money laundering and prostitution).
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reporting institution to have discovered terrorism connections during the
examination process, or for FinCEN to have done so when receiving the
SAR. However, because researchers did not have access to this information
it is impossible to determine at this time.
The one case indicating a possible set of transactions that might be
a unique indicator for terrorism financing involved repeat purchases from a
military equipment store. To determine if this should raise a suspicion of
terrorism finance, it would be necessary to see if such purchases are, in fact,
sufficiently unusual to distinguish them in a meaningful way from nonterrorism related purchases. This could perhaps be done by comparing them
with other purchases from similar stores. Researchers will attempt to locate
such information for the final Report.
SUMMARY TABLE
DATA, TYPE OF TRANSACTION(S), SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION

Case

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

1

Detailed information
on wire and check
transactions.

2

General description
only.

3
4

No description.
General description
only.

Multiple significant wire
transfers among charities
with bank accounts m
various jurisdictions; final
withdrawal of cash transferred to terrorist organization. No obvious legitimate connection.
Single significant wire
transfer from a personal
bank account in the US to
a personal bank account
in Canada. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Unknown.
Cash deposits to personal
bank account followed by
a series of small denominated checks paid to a
business umelated to the
payor. No obvious legitimate connection.

#

Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, integration.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layenng.
PC: Yes.

Unknown.
Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, possible integration.
PC: No.
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Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

5

General description
only.

6

Detailed information
on wire and check
transactions.

7

General description
only.

8

General description
only.

9

General description
only.

Large wire transfers from
personal accounts in one
jurisdiction to multiple
accounts in another. No
obvious legitimate connection.
Wire and check transfers
from company account
controlled by one person
m one jurisdiction to a
personal account controlled by the same person
in another jurisdiction.
Significant cash deposits
and w1re transfers from
various personal accom1ts
to a single person's account, followed by transfers to a charity in another
jurisdiction, followed by
further transfers to multiple accounts in other jurisdictions. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Wire or check transactions from one charity to
numerous accounts of
unknown control, receipt
of a very large amount
from a foreign account of
unknown control to a
charity. No obvious legitimate connection.
Significant cross border
wire transaction from
company in one jurisdiction with possible ownership/control held by possible terrorists to numerous accounts m other
jurisdictions of unknmvn
control. No obvious legitimate connection.
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Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
Yes.
ML: Placement, layering and/or unlicensedMSB.
PC: No.
ST:No.
PC No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, possible integration, and/or unlicensed MSB.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Possible placement (depending on
nature of deposits),
layering.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.

ST: Yes.
ML: Possible placement (depending on
nature of deposits),
layering.
PC: No.
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Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

Sale of stolen telephone cards.
General description
only.

Unknown.

Suspicious Tnmsaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Unknown.
PC: Yes.
ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, and/or unlicensedMSB.
PC: Yes.

798
Case
#

10
11

12

General description
only.

13

General description
only.

14

Detailed information.

Cash deposits, large international wire transfers
from personal bank accounts under false name
to money transfer companies with unknown account names/owner or
controller. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Large number of cash
deposits under different
business names at various
banks to a single account
at one business with no
obvious business connection, large wire transfers
from that business to different bank accounts m
other jurisdictions. No
obvious legitimate connection.
Numerous deposits made
to various individual accounts, then transferred to
single accounts in different jurisdiction, then
checks paid to individuals
in a third jurisdiction. No
obvious legitimate connection.
Small amounts sent via
wire transfers from a bank
account in one jurisdiction
to various individual bank
accounts in another jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed MSB.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, possible integration.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.

ST:No.

2012]

TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS

Case
#

Data Available

Type of Trausaction(s)

15

Some detailed information on wire and
check transactions,
some actual transaction records.

16

General description
only.

17

General description
only.

18

General description
only.

19

Detailed information.

Large international wire
transfers from various
charitable and personal
accounts in one jurisdiction to personal accounts
in another jurisdiction
(some in the name of the
same individual) in another jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection
in all cases.
Small MSB wire transfers
by a person in one jurisdiction to a person in
another jurisdiction.
Large bank transfers from
accounts in one jurisdiction to multiple accounts
held by one person at
multiple banks in another
jurisdiction. Large numbers of transfers from one
personal bank account in
that jurisdiction to many
different recipient accounts in the same jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection.
Direct bank transfers from
a charity in one jurisdiction to two charities m
another jurisdiction.
Large transfers from a
number of individual banlc
accounts in one country to
a number of individual
bank accounts m other
countries. No obvious
legitimate counection.
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Suspicious Tnu:D.saction(s) [STJ?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, possible integration.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.

ST:No.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, possible integration.
PC: Unclear.

ST: No.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.
ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering.
PC: Yes.
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Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of cdme
[PC]?
ST: Possible.
ML: Large transfers
to umelated person
may not fit client
profile raising suspicion oflayering.
PC: No.

Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

20

General description
only.

21

No description.

Wire transfers from personal accounts in one
jurisdiction to the personal accounts of the same
individual in other jurisdictions. Large wire transfers from one personal
account in the US to the
personal account of an
unconnected individual in
another jurisdiction. No
obvious legitimate connection?
Unknown.

22

Some detailed information.

23

General description
only.
Court documents
provide detailed information on wire and
check transactions
including payment
records.

24

25

General description
only.

Large wire transfers from
company account in one
jurisdiction to account in
another. Because a sting
operation, unknown if
recipient account was
profiled by bank.
Size and origin ofMSB
wire transfers unknown.
Small deposits to charity
bank account in one jurisdiction, wire transfers to
large number of unrelated
individual bank accounts
m another jurisdiction,
then w1re transfers to
large number of unrelated
individual bank accounts
in various additional jurisdictions, then cash
withdrawn. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Deposits.

ST: Unknown.
No.
ST: Unknown.
PC: Presumed no.

ST: Unlmown.
PC: Yes.
ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, integration.
PC: No.

ST:No.

2012]

TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS

Case
#

Data Available

Type of Tnmsaction(s)

26

General description
only.

27

General description
only.

28

General description
only.

29

General description
only.

Cross border payments of
unknown type, single
small cross border wire
transfer.
Small number of small
MSB wire transfers from
one jurisdiction to several
individuals in multiple
jurisdictions.
Fraudulent credit card
application, credit card
payments.
Debit card payments to a
designated terrorist organization and to high-tech
military equipment comparries; medium sized
cross-border wire transfer
to an unknown person.

30

General description
only.

Medium-sized cross border wire transfer.
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Suspicious Tnmsaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Unknown.

ST:No.
ST:No.

ST:No.
PC: Yes.
ST: Possible.
TF: Repeat purchases
from military equipment store?
PC: No.

ST:No.
PC: No.

ANNEX: TTERRORISM INDICATORS
Definitions
Placement: is the first stage of the money laundering process, and is used to
“introduce the unlawful proceeds into the financial system without attracting the
attention of financial institutions or law enforcement.”1 This can be accomplished
by depositing cash into a bank account. The exchange of one currency into
another, as well as the conversion of smaller notes into larger denominations may
occur at this stage. Furthermore, illegal funds may be converted into financial
instruments, such as money orders or checks, and commingled with legitimate
funds to divert suspicion. Furthermore, placement may be accomplished by the
cash purchase of a security or a form of an insurance contract.2
Layering: is the second stage of the money laundering process, moving funds
through the financial system to “create confusion and complicate the paper trail.”3
The second money laundering stage occurs after the ill-gotten gains have entered
the financial system, at which point the funds, securities or insurance contracts are
converted or moved to other institutions, further separating them from their
criminal source. Such funds could then be used to purchase other securities,
insurance contracts or other easily transferable investment instruments and then
sold through yet another institution. The funds could also be transferred by any
form of negotiable instrument such as check, money order, bearer bond, or the
funds can be transferred electronically to other accounts in various jurisdictions.
The launderer may also disguise the transfer as a payment for goods or services or
transfer the funds to a shell corporation.4
Integration: is the “ultimate goal of the money laundering process.” Following
the layering stage, “the integration stage is used to create the appearance of
legality through additional transactions. These transactions further shield the
criminal from a recorded connection to the funds by providing a plausible
explanation for the source of the funds.”5

1

FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 12 (April 2010), hereinafter BSA/AML MANUAL.
2
Paul Allan Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM: SECOND EDITION AND SUPPLEMENT ON SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
I-7
(2006),
hereinafter
Schott,
REFERENCE
GUIDE,
available
at
http://www.Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf.
3
BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 12.
4
Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at I-8.
5
BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 12.

Smurfing: is a strategy commonly employed by money launderers in the
placement and layering stages, where large amounts of cash are broken into
smaller, less conspicuous amounts that are below the country’s reporting
threshold and deposited over time in different offices of a single financial
institution or in multiple financial institutions.6
Cases7
1. Abdulrahman Alamoudi.
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (“HLF”) was a
non-profit corporation organized in 1989, with its headquarters in Richardson,
Texas.8 It was originally incorporated under the name Occupied Land Fund, and
changed its corporate name to Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
in 1991. HLF was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity
(“SDGT”) in 2001 for funding Hamas. The Success Foundation was a USregistered charity with bank account in Bank of America. The Happy Hearts Trust
was an Isle of Man trust with bank accounts at Bank Mercantile in Um-El-Fahem,
Israel, and Harbisons Bank, UK. The Humanitarian Relief Association (“HRA”),
with a bank account at Bank Mercantile, Humanitarian Appeal International
(“HAI”), a corporation located in Onex, Switzerland, with a bank account at
Harbisons Bank.9
Alamoudi had signature rights at Success, Happy Hearts, HRA, and HAI.
Wire transfers and check payments were made among HLF, Success, Happy
6

Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at VI-25.
Case documents are on file with the author.
8
Terrorist financing often involves the “improper use of charitable or relief funds.” BSA/AML
MANUAL, supra note 1 at 13. FinCEN has identified the “use of unfamiliar charity/relief
organization[s] as a link in transactions” and “wire transfer activities to and from multiple relief
and/or charitable organizations, domestic and foreign” as indicators of terrorism finance and
money laundering. John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends,
Tips
&
Issues,
August
2002,
pg.
20,
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_04.pdf.
As noted in the BSA/AML
Examination Manual, “[b]ecause NGOs can be used to obtain funds for charitable organizations,
the flow of funds both into and out of the NGO can be complex, making them susceptible to abuse
by money launderers and terrorists. BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at 320. Furthermore,
FATF recognizes that charities are particularly susceptible to terrorism financiers because: (1)
“they enjoy the public trust”; (2) they “have access to considerable sources of funds”; (3) “their
activities are often cash-intensive”; (4) they often “have a global presence”; (5) they are “often in
or near areas most exposed to terrorist activity”; and (6) they are “subject to significantly lighter
regulatory requirements than financial institutions or publicly-held corporate entities.” FATF,
Terrorist
Financing,
Feb.
2008,
pg
11,
available
at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf. As such, the Special Recommendations require countries
to implement laws and regulations designed to prevent non-profit organizations from being used
by terrorist financiers. Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at IX-12.
9
Id.
7

Hearts, HRA, and HAI finally to Association Secours Palestinian, a foundation
located in Basel, Switzerland and with a bank account there.10 Cash was finally
distributed to Hamas, also a SDGT.1112 See also Holy Land Foundation and
Benevolence International Foundation cases below.
Data: Court documents provide detailed information on wire and check
transactions among these organizations. Actual payment records were not
available as they were not themselves admitted as evidence.
Type of Transaction(s): Multiple wire transfers among charities with bank
accounts in various jurisdictions, with final withdrawal of cash transferred to
terrorist organization.13 Ownership, control etc. of each charity is not immediately
obvious.14
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, integration.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
2. Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali Alishtari (aka Michael Mixon)
Ali Alishtari (“Alishtari”) was the administrator of a loan investment
program. Alishtari was under FBI surveillance which used a sting operation. He
secretly tried to send $152,000 stolen through fraud from the investment program
to the Middle East to buy equipment such as night vision goggles for a terrorist
training camp in Afghanistan.1516 As part of this he wire-transferred about
10

Layering.
Integration.
12
Wire transfers among shell companies can be indicative of money laundering transactions. As
noted by FinCEN, “[many] suspicious wire transfer patterns involve shell companies—i.e.,
corporations that engage in no apparent business activity and that only serve as a conduit for funds
or securities. Often, the activities also involve foreign transactors located in jurisdictions
considered non-compliant or problematic.” John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN, The SAR
Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, October 2000, pp 11-12 available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_01.pdf. For a list of risk factors that make
transactions among shell companies suspicious and indicate money laundering, see BSA/AML
MANUAL, supra note 1 at F-7. See also John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR
Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, August 2004, pg. 3-9, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_07.pdf (discussing shell corporations and
potential indicators of possible shell corporation and shell bank misuse).
13
See supra text accompanying note 7.
14
See supra text accompanying note 11.
15
Placement.
16
FinCEN notes that “[t]errorist organizations [may] use alternative and less obvious means to
acquire and move capital. Those means may involve committing crimes that, in the past, were not
immediately associated with terrorist fundraising and financing schemes.” John J. Byrne & David
K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, August 2004, pg. 3, available
11

$25,000 from his personal bank account in New York to a personal bank account
in Montreal, Canada, where he believed the money would be transferred to
Afghanistan.17 Alishtari plead guilty in September, 2009 to material support.
However, because of the plea agreement, no direct evidence regarding the
transfers was admitted.
Data: Court documents describe payment forms only in generalities.
Type of Transaction(s): Single significant wire transfer from a personal bank
account in the US to a personal bank account in Canada.18
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering.
Proceeds of Crime? Yes.
3. Amawi, El-Hindi, and Mazloum.
Beginning in June 2004, Mohammed Zaki Amawi, Marwan El-Hindi and
Wassim Mazloum allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to kill or maim persons
outside the United States, including U.S. armed forces personnel in Iraq, and to
kill then President George Bush. The three defendants allegedly provided material
support, including money, training, communications equipment, computers and
at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_07.pdf. Suspicious activity reporting has
uncovered similar investment fraud schemes in the U.S. See John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt,
FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, October 2000, pg. 16, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_01.pdf; John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles,
FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, November 2003, pg. 46, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_06.pdf.
17
Layering.
18
Moving money by wire transfer is a “primary technique for moving terrorist funds.” FATF,
Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment, July 2010, pg 24, available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf. Indeed, wire transfers are one of the top
three activities described in U.S. Suspicious Activity Reports filed as a result of a name match
with a government terror list. John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN, The SAR Activity
Review:
Trends,
Tips
&
Issues,
August
2002,
pg.
26,
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_04.pdf. For a list of risk factors that make fund
transfers suspicious and indicate money laundering, see Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, April 2010, pp. F-2-3,
F-10. See also John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips
&
Issues,
April
2005,
pg.
25,
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_08.pdf (reporting the discovery of terrorism
finance where Defendants engaged in a series of overseas financial transactions, but funneling all
money through a U.S. branch of a bank headquartered in the Middle East). Terrorism-related wire
activity is often to and from Middle Eastern countries. John J. Byrne & David M. Vogt, FinCEN,
The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, February 2003, pg. 22, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_05.pdf.

personnel, including themselves, to unnamed co-conspirators in the Middle East,
knowing that the materials would be used in waging violent jihad against the U.S.
military and Coalition forces in Iraq and elsewhere. The object of the conspiracy
was allegedly to obtain funds from the LITC federal grant program through ESFS,
a Toledo-based non-profit charitable organization, to divert the grant funds.19 On
Feb. 19, the Treasury Department ordered U.S. banks to freeze the assets of
ESFS; other items seized by federal agents during the arrests included bank
accounts.
In September 2008 the defendants were convicted. No documents
concerning financial transactions were introduced into evidence.
Data: Court documents do not describe payment forms.
Type of Transaction(s): Unknown.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.
4. Yassin Muhiddin Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain.
In 2005, Yassin Muhiddin Aref (“Aref”) and Mohammed Mosharref
Hossain (“Hossain”) were indicted for conspiracy to engage in money laundering
and substantive acts of money laundering and material support. They agreed to
work with an informant in a scheme to conceal the source of $50,000.20 The
cooperator told the defendants that the money came from the sale of a surface-toair missile to a designated terrorist group called Jaish-e-Mohammed.
A cooperating witness (“CW”) proposed a scheme to provide the $50,000
cash proceeds from the importation of the SAM to Hossain who would, in turn,
provide monthly checks written to the CW's business, Hay's Distributors, in the
total amount of $45,000.21 Hossain would keep the remaining $5,000. CW
provided cash payments totaling $40,000 in the form of five deliveries between
January 2, 2004 and June 9, 2004.22 Each time, Aref received and counted the
cash and then gave it to Hossain. Aref provided receipts to the CW for the cash.
Hossain deposited the amounts to his personal bank account. He then wrote
checks ten checks made payable to Hay’s Distributors between January 2, 2004
and August 3, 2004.23
19

See supra text accompanying note 7.
Money Laundering can be “The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property
is derived from any [drug trafficking] offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such
offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or
of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses to evade
the legal consequences of his actions;” Schott, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 2 at 21.
21
See supra text accompanying note 15.
22
Placement; Smurfing.
23
Layering; Smurfing
20

Defendants were charged with conspiracy and attempt to commit money
laundering and to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization.
The Government alleged that the defendants agreed to work with a cooperator in a
scheme to conceal the source of $50,000. The cooperator told the defendants that
the money came from the sale of a surface-to-air missile to a designated terrorist
group called Jaish-e-Mohammed. The missile was to be fired at a target in New
York City. In 2007 Hossain was convicted on all twenty-seven counts against
him. Aref was convicted on ten counts and acquitted on the others. While
prosecutors have agreed to provide documentation on payments they have yet to
do so.
Data: Court documents describe transactions only in generalities. Additional
documents expected.
Type of Transaction(s): Significant number of cash deposits to personal bank
account followed by a series of small denominated checks paid to a business
unrelated to the payor.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, possible integration.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
5. Mohammad Anvari-Hamedani.
According to prosecutors Anvari-Hamedani was a hawaladar who engaged
in a series of transactions involving wire transfers of approximately $4 million in
funds and equipment to Iran, using his account at Merril Lynch in the United
States, to intermediary banks Great Britain, Hong Kong, and then to the United
Arab Emirates then to Iran.2425 He pleaded guilty in 2006 for operating an
unlicensed money service business.26 Details on payments were not admitted as
evidence.
24

See supra text accompanying note 17.
See supra text accompanying note 11.
26
With limited exceptions, many MSBs are subject to the full range of BSA regulatory
requirements, including the anti-money laundering program rule, suspicious activity and currency
transaction reporting rules, and various other identification and recordkeeping rules.253 Existing
FinCEN regulations require certain MSBs to register with FinCEN.254 Finally, many states have
established supervisory requirements, often including the requirement that an MSB be licensed
with the state(s) in which it is incorporated or does business. BSA/AML MANUAL, supra note 1 at
309. FinCEN notes that “Personal accounts used as “layering” points involving wire transfers sent
into those accounts from unregistered and/or unlicensed MSBs and then transferred abroad”.
Indeed, it also mentions “a subject engaged in the suspected operation of an unlicensed MSB
conducting numerous outgoing wire transmissions out of his personal account”. See John J. Byrne
25

Data: Court documents describe payment forms only in generalities.27
Type of Transaction(s): Large wire transfers from personal accounts in one
jurisdiction to multiple accounts in another.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering and/or unlicensed
MSB.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
6. Khalid Awan
In May 2004, Khalid Awan (“Awan”) was being held at the Metropolitan
Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, where he encountered Harjit Singh
(“Singh”), another inmate who was awaiting sentencing, who became a
cooperating witness. During their conversations, Awan told Singh that he knew a
Pakistani terrorist named Paramjit Singh Panjwar leader of the Khalistan
Commando Force ("KCF"), a Sikh terrorist organization which had conducted
violent attacks against people and property in India. Awan assisted in transferring
his own money and assisting others in transferring money to the KCF. Awan
accomplished this in part by wire transferring/sending checks from the Tee Jay's
Fashion account in moderate amounts at HSBC bank, controlled by his friend Mr.
Butt, to an account controlled by Mr. Butt at Habib Bank in Pakistan.28
Prosecutors provided details of these transactions as well as additional evidence in
the form of recorded conversations but actual payment records were not available
as they were not themselves admitted as evidence.
Data: Court documents providing detailed information on wire and check
transactions among these organizations. Actual payment records were not
available as they were not themselves admitted as evidence.

& David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, November 2003,
pg. 7&8, available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_06.pdf.
27
Reports indicating excessive outbound wire activity were common in Suspicious Activity
Reports filed by the securities and futures industries. Preliminary indicators are that individuals
who engage in this activity within one year of establishing a brokerage account were more likely
to send funds outside of the U.S. John J. Byrne & David K. Gilles, FinCEN, The SAR Activity
Review:
Trends,
Tips
&
Issues,
October,
2005,
pg.
14
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_09.pdf. See also id. at 37 (defendants deposited
drug proceeds into more than 50 bank accounts in the name of front companies, and then
transferred the funds to various countries).
28
See supra text accompanying note 17.

Type of Transaction(s): Wire and check transfers from company account
controlled by one person in one jurisdiction to a personal account controlled by
the same person in another jurisdiction. Could be distribution of profits.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.
Proceeds of Crime? No.

7. Al-Barakat, Abdirahman Isse and Abdillah Abdi.
Abdirahman Isse (“Isse”) and Abdillah Abdi (“Abdi”) received cash funds
from customers; they deposited the funds in multiple accounts of businesses
controlled by them at various branches of banks in Northern Virginia. To avoid
the $10,000 threshold for reporting transactions, they always deposited the
amounts with the banks in sums of less than $10,000, usually between $9,000 and
$9,990, and on some days, they made several such deposits.2930 Because the
deposits were in cash amounts less than $10,000, they did not prompt the banks to
file currency transaction reports. Isse and Abdi then wired the funds from the
bank accounts to the Al-Barakat headquarters in the United Arab Emirates, a
registered charity.3132 Following this, transfers were made from the account to
personal and other bank accounts in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan.33 As
compensation for each transmission of funds for a customer, the defendants
generally retained 1% of the deposit and remitted another 3% to Al-Barakat, of
which Al-Barakat kept two-thirds (2% of the total deposit) and remitted the
remaining one-third (1% of the total deposit) to the agent in the receiving
country.34 Mohammad Hussein was involved in similar activity in Al-Barakat’s
Boston operations. Isse and Abdi pled guilty to structuring in 2003. No detailed
transaction records were offered as evidence.
Data: Court documents provide only general description.
No.

Proceeds of Crime?

Type of Transaction(s): Significant cash deposits and wire transfers from various
personal accounts to a single person’s account, followed by transfers to a charity

29

Placement.
Smurfing.
31
Layering; see supra text accompanying note 17.
32
See supra text accompanying note 7.
33
Layering.
34
Possible integration.
30

in another jurisdiction, followed by further transfers to multiple accounts in other
jurisdictions.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, possible integration,
and/or an MSB.

8. Benevolence International Foundation, Enaam Arnaout
The Benevolence International Foundation (“BIF”) claimed to be a
nonprofit, religious, humanitarian, charitable organization funded by donations
from individuals, businesses, and other Islamic organizations and dedicated to
assisting individuals afflicted by war, natural disaster, and extreme poverty.3536
Also according to BIF, since 1992, it had administered essential humanitarian aid
to the poor in needy areas of the world, by distributing food, clothing, and
medical services in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, China, and Pakistan, and
by operating hospitals, medical and dental clinics, and orphanages in places such
as Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Daghestan, and Ingushetia, using payments to accounts
of foreign branch offices. BIF, was an Illinois corporation with offices in Illinois
and New Jersey and approximately ten offices overseas. Allegedly Enaam
Arnaout (“Arnaout”), who in 1993 assumed formal management of BIF, had
secretly (i.e. concealed from many donors to BIF) used a portion of the money
raised by BIF to support Mujahideen, including al-Qaeda, engaged in armed
confrontations and violence overseas, such as in Chechnya and BosniaHerzegovina. Arnaout allegedly transferred funds from BIF’s checking accounts
in Illinois to various bank accounts in New Jersey and outside the United States,
although the owner/controller of those bank accounts was not revealed. Also, an
unknown person’s account at the Union Bank of Switzerland wire transferred
$1,414,406 to BIF’s checking account in the United States. Those funds were
commingled in BIF’s checking account with donations that BIF received from
other sources and disbursed in large part to the BIF offices overseas.
On December 14, 2001 U.S. Treasury blocked all BIF assets. FBI
searched the Chicago offices of BIF and Arnaout’s home, seizing from both
places items such as financial records, office equipment, and personal property.
Charges included conspiracy to engage in financial transactions involving
proceeds of unlawful activities, namely mail fraud and wire fraud, with the intent
to promote those crimes, as well as to provide material support to organizations
35
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involved in violent activities; and to transfer funds from within the United States
to outside the United States with intent to give material support to organizations
engaged in violent activities.3738 In 2003 Enaam Arnaout pled guilty to
racketeering only. Evidence concerning transactions was not introduced.
Data: Court documents provide only general description of payment transactions.
Proceeds of Crime?
Type of Transaction(s): Wire or check transactions from one charity to numerous
accounts of unknown control, receipt of a very large amount from a foreign
account of unknown control to a charity.39
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Possible placement, layering.
Proceeds of Crime? Diversion of charitable donations.

9. BMI/Mostan, Soliman Bihieri, Mousa Mohammad Abu Marzook, Ghaleb
Himmat and Youssef Nada
In 1985, BMI was incorporated in New Jersey. The articles of
incorporation of BMI listed Soliman S. Biheiri (“Biheiri”), an Egyptian convicted
of immigration violations, as an incorporator and as BMI’s President. In 1988,
Mostan International Corporation (“Mostan”) was incorporated in New Jersey.
Bihieri was an incorporator and Vice President and was Mostan’s registered agent
and Director. Mousa Mohammad Abu Marzook (“Marzook”), the selfproclaimed political leader of Hamas and an SDGT in Novermber 1, 2001, was its
president. Mostan was established to generate funds for Marzook/Hamas.
Marzook was its sole shareholder.
Mostan had an account at the Bank of New York. The bank records for
Mostan showed large wire transfers to overseas accounts.40 Biheiri’s computer
was searched and found to have contact information for Ghaleb Himmat and
Youssef Nada.
BMI reported more than $25,000,000 in projected revenues and leases as
early as 1992 in a business that solicited real-estate investments and offered
leasing services for Muslims in what was alleged to be a scheme based in Virginia
and Maryland to raise cash for terrorists.41
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BMI's investors included Abu Marzook, who was an investor in an Oxon Hill
real-estate development known as Barnaby Knolls which was financed through a
BMI subsidiary, BMI Real Estate Development Inc., and involved the
construction of 57 homes, beginning in January 1991; Yasin Qadi (“Qadi”), a
Saudi multimillionaire involved in banking, chemicals, diamonds and real estate,
who was designated by the Treasury Department in 2002 as a terrorist and is
suspected of diverting millions of dollars to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.
Authorities alleged that Qadi led the Saudi-based Muwafaq (Blessed Relief)
Foundation, which the U.S. Treasury Department said was used as a front for alQaeda to launder millions of dollars to the terrorist organization. Yousef Nada, an
Egyptian national and resident of Switzerland, who was designated a terrorist
financier by the U.S. and U.N. in November 2001. U.S. law-enforcement
authorities suspected that Nada provided significant funding to al-Qaeda; Nada is
a founder of Al-Taqwa Bank, which was alleged to be at the center of a financial
network that helped fund global terrorism. The U.S. Treasury Department
designated the bank an SDGT shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Bihieri was found guilty in 2004 of making false statements. Marzook was
indicted for various terrorism related crimes and money laundering in absentia in
2003.
In 2006 Nada sued the Swiss government because of financial losses
incurred resulting from the three-and-a-half year investigation. “It was all wrong,”
Nada, the 75-year-old founder and former managing director of Nada
Management, formerly known as al-Taqwa, said at his home in Italy near the
Swiss border. "Switzerland was mistaken and misled." In 2005 the Swiss
authorities dropped their investigation. But Switzerland was forced to drop the
case against top officials of the company on July 1, 2005 because they said
authorities in the Bahamas had failed to provide essential bank records by a court
deadline.
Data: Court documents provide only general information on payment transactions,
including the “significant wire transfers overseas” from BMI. Details on
transactions are expected from prosecutors.
Type of Transaction(s): Significant cross border wire transaction from company
in one jurisdiction with possible ownership/control held by possible terrorists to
numerous accounts in other jurisdictions of unknown control.4243
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Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Possible placement (depending on nature
of deposits), layering. Possible terrorism financing due the terrorist-related
ownership/control of payor.44
Proceeds of Crime? No.

10. The Detroit Sleeper Cell Case, Karim Koubriti, Ahmed Hannan, Farouk
Ali-Hammoud and Abdel-Ilah Elmardoudi
This is a troublesome case, with allegations of material support and fraud
followed by allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Karim Koubriti (“Koubriti”)
was found guilty of providing material support to a terrorist group and Ahmed
Hannan (“Hannan”) had been found guilty of identification forgery, but these
convictions were overturned in 2004 when the lead prosecutor and star witness
were accused of mishandling evidence and providing false testimony,
respectively. Koubriti and Hannqn were found guilty of mail fraud, insurance
fraud and material support of terrorism in connection with his ‘economic jihad’
scheme to defraud an insurance firm.
Exactly how these funds were used to support terrorism, and through what
financing means, is not clear from available court documents. Abdel-Ilah
Elmardoudi was convicted for operating a phone card “shoulder surfing” scheme
in which he stole hundreds of telephone calling-card numbers from unsuspecting
travelers at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport and then “supplied
them to overseas callers who used them” to make a total of $745,000 in
international calls from Egypt, Kuwait, East Africa, the Philippines, the Middle
East, and the Balkans.
The lead prosecutor was dismissed from this case for prosecutorial
misconduct and later prosecuted. After speaking with his attorney and attempting
to negotiate a discussion he decided not to discuss the case. So far, we have been
unable to locate anyone at Department of Justice who is willing to discuss the
case.
Data: Court documents provide no description.
Type of Transaction(s): Unknown.

Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing, 2006, at 175 available at
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Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.
Proceeds of Crime? Yes.
11. Hossein Esfahani.
According to allegations Hossein Esfahani (“Esfahani”) was a hawaladar
who transmitted funds to and from Iran by means of wire transfers through
intermediary money exchanges in Dubai via Harris Bank to Dubai from October
31, 2001 through February 14, 2005, in breach of financial sanctions against
Iran.45 Using the false name “Ahmad Khalij,” Esfahani set up various shell bank
accounts in the U.S.46 Deposits ranged from just $200 to $150,000, much of
which was proceeds of drug crime.47 The majority of the nearly $4,000,000 sent
to Iran was wired to three Dubai money transfer companies, and, from there to
Shiraz, Iran.48 In the remaining cases he “used hawala to send cash to Iran.”
While terrorism financing is not directly alleged it seems clear that Esfahani was
trying to evade detection, so similar issues arise.
In 2006 Esfahani pled guilty to operating an unlicensed MSB and to
breaching sanctions against Iran. We have contacted prosecutors to see what if
any evidence on transactions was admitted to trial but they have not responded to
repeated requests.
Data: Court documents provide only general descriptions of payment types.
Because Esfahani pled guilty it may be that no details were admitted into
evidence.
Type of Transaction(s): Cash deposits, large international wire transfers from
personal bank accounts under false name to money transfer companies with
unknown account names/owner or controller.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed
MSB.
Proceeds of Crime? Yes.
12. Abad Elfgeeh.
Abad Elfgeeh (“Elfgeeh”) was a hawaladar who maintained an account for
Carnival French Ice Cream (“Carnival”) at J.P. Morgan Chase, as well 12 feeder
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accounts at Chase and other banks in the names of various physical persons and
businesses.49 Large totals of money was deposited into the Carnival account in
small amounts as transfers from the feeder accounts and large sums of money was
wired out of the Carnival account to accounts in 25 foreign countries, although the
names of the receiving accounts are not noted.50 For example, in a one-month
period during the fall of 2000, more than $245,000 was deposited into the
Carnival account and more than $268,000 was wired out. Between 1996 and
2003, the total amount deposited into the Carnival account was $22,190,642.21,
and the total amount withdrawn was $ 21,995,556.54. Another Chase bank
account in the name of the Prospect Deli that was opened by Aref and listed the
home address and telephone number of Elfgeeh, which was the same accountopening information used for another feeder account at Astoria Federal Bank. The
Prospect Deli was a business a few blocks away from the Carnival French Ice
Cream shop; the Prospect Deli was in operation only from 1996 to 1998, but
activity in the Prospect Deli bank account continued until 2002.51 For example,
bank records showed that in 2001 approximately $850,000 was deposited into the
Prospect Deli account and about $ 823,000 was transferred out to the Carnival
account.
Evidence showed Elfgeeh’s money transfers were tied to Sheikh
Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad, who was sentenced to 75 years in a U.S.
prison and fined $1,250,000 for conspiring to support and fund al-Qaeda and
Hamas. Elfgeeh was convicted in 2006 of running an unlicensed MSB. Repeated
requests for assistance from prosecutors to help identify if any payments records
were admitted as evidence have been unsuccessful.
Data: Court documents provide only general descriptions of payment types.
Because Esfahani pled guilty it may be that no details were admitted into
evidence.
Type of Transaction(s): Large number of cash deposits under different business
names at various banks to a single account at one business with no obvious
business connection, large wire transfers from that business to different bank
accounts in other jurisdictions.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed
MSB.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
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13. Help the Needy, Rafil Dhafir, Maher Zagha, Ayman Jarwan, and
Osameh Al-Wahaidy
Rafil Dhafir (“Dhafir”), Maher Zagha (“Zagha”), Ayman Jarwan
(“Jarwan”), and Osameh Al-Wahaidy (“Al-Wahaidy”) and the two unregistered
charities, Help the Needy and Help the Needy Endowment, Inc., allegedly
solicited contributions from people in the United States, deposited these funds in
accounts in their own names at Oneida Savings Bank and Key Bank in New York
in accounts opened and controlled by Dhafir, Jarwan, and Al-Wahaidy.52
Payments were then made to accounts in the name of Zagha held at Fleet Bank,
then paid to another account in Zagha’s name at the Jordan Islamic Bank in
Amman.53 One or more banks filed a suspicious activity report although the
details of the report were not identified. From there, checks as large as $ 100,000
were paid to individuals Iraq in breach of sanctions.54 After Zagha’s Key Bank
account was closed, transfers were made directly from HTN’s accounts to
Zagha’s account in Jordan.55 Over $2.7 million was moved through accounts at
the Jordan Islamic Bank.
Dhafir was convicted in 2005 of various charges. The others pled guilty in 2003.
Researchers have contacted prosecutors to see if documents regarding payments
were admitted as evidence but they have yet to respond.
Data: Court documents provide only general descriptions of payment types.
Type of Transaction(s): Numerous deposits made to various individual accounts,
then transferred to single accounts in different jurisdiction, then checks paid to
individuals in a third jurisdiction.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering, possible integration.
Proceeds of Crime? Diversion of charitable contributions.
14. Rahmat Abd Hir, Zulkifli Abd Hir Zulkifli
Rahmat Abd Hir’s (“Abd Hir”) brother is Zulkifli Abd Hir Zulkifli
(“Zulkifli”), an acknowledged member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and
an alleged high-ranking member of Jemaah Islamiyah in the Philippines. Abd Hir
consistently responded to Zulkifli's requests for money and supplies by wiring
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over $10,000 to his brother using various bank accounts in the Philippines.
Prosecutors provided detailed information on the wire transfers.
Data: Detailed information on wire transfers.
Type of Transaction(s): Small amounts sent via wire transfers from a bank
account in one jurisdiction to various individual bank accounts in another
jurisdiction.56
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No. Recipient was a suspected terrorist making
the case obvious.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
15. Holy Land Foundation, KindHearts, Khaled Smaili, Abu Marzook
See also discussion above at Alamoudi regarding HLF. The Global Relief
Foundation (“GRF”), a U.S. charity, was affiliated with HLF and also designated
an SGTD.57 After these designations a former GRF official Khaled Smaili
established KindHearts, a U.S. charity, in January 2002 to continue the missions
of both HLF and GRF without a designation.58
Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook (“Marzook”), a senior member of Hamas since
1997, served as the Deputy Chairman of Hamas Political Bureau. Marzook
provided substantial funds to the HLF in the early 1990s. Between 1992 and1993
Marzook wire transferred from various accounts of the charities and some
personal accounts nearly $1,000,000 to Salah’s personal bank accounts at LaSalle
Bank of Chicago.5960 After Salah arrived in Israel he arranged to have
approximately $230,000 from his personal bank accounts in Chicago transferred
to his personal bank accounts in an Israeli bank for distribution to Hamas
members. He was then taken into custody there. In April 1993, when Salah
remained in custody in Israel, his wife withdrew approximately $536,000 from
their joint personal LaSalle Bank account and deposited the amount into another
account at Standard Bank and Trust for personal use in paying off a loan.
In 2007 there was a mistrial, but in 2008 HLF and five of its leaders on
charges of providing material support to Hamas.
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Data: Court documents provide detailed information on wire and check
transactions among these organizations and persons. Many actual payment
records (check and wire transactions) are also available.
Type of Transaction(s): Large international wire transfers from various charitable
and personal accounts in one jurisdiction to personal accounts in another
jurisdiction (some in the name of the same individual) in another jurisdiction.6162
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, possible integration.
Proceeds of Crime? Diversion of charitable donations.
16. Richard David Hupper.
On several occasions during an almost two year period of time, Richard
David Hupper (“Hupper”) provided money to Hassam Jamjoun (“Jamjoun”), a
Hamas figure, in Israel. This money was transferred by cash in person by Hupper
and also by way of a Western Union cash wire transfer to Jamjoun in Israel.6364
Jamjoun was to transfer these funds to Hamas for a variety of things, including
assisting the families of Israeli-imprisoned Hamas members. In May of 2008
Hupper pled guilty to one count of providing material support to Hamas. Because
of the guilty plea no evidence on the transfers was submitted. However,
researchers contacted Hupper’s attorney in the hope of persuading Hupper to
provide the information himself. While he has so far not agreed to cooperate we
hope that he will eventually change his mind.
Data: Court documents provide no information on the transactions. It is hoped
that Hupper may provide these documents voluntarily.
Type of Transaction(s): Small MSB wire transfers by a person in one jurisdiction
to a person in another jurisdiction.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No. Recipient of Western Union transfer was a
known Hamas figure making the case obvious.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
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17. Islamic Assembly of North America, Omar Al Hussayen.
According to the indictment, between November 16, 1999 and February
26, 2003, Omar Al Hussayen (“Al Hussayen”) was an employee, official, and
registered agent of the Islamic Assembly of North America (“IANA”). IANA was
a U.S. registered non-profit charitable organization with offices in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.65 As such, he engaged in significant decision-making and business
transactions related to the IANA’s business, particularly with respect to the
creation, maintenance and content of websites and other internet media. He also
set up a number of web sites for various jihadi organizations, including Hamas.
Al Hussayen came to the United States from Saudi Arabia to study at the
University of Idaho. While there he received a stipend for living expenses from
Saudi Arabia. During that same time he maintained at least six United States bank
accounts in Indiana, Texas, Idaho and Michigan. From at least January 23, 1997,
until February 26, 2003, he received into and disbursed out of these accounts
around $300,000 dollars in excess of the stipend he received during the same
period.66 Beginning November 16, 1999 he disbursed funds to and on behalf of
IANA and its officers, including its president, to pay various operating expenses,
including employee salaries and foreign and domestic IANA-related travel
expenses for himself and others. He also disbursed money directly to the president
of the IANA via wire transfers and personal checks and maintained a checking
account in Michigan in his name alone, but with the president’s home address.
About $100,000 of the money allegedly came in two installments from the
student's uncle, Saleh Abdel Rahman Al-Hussayen.
According to the Justice Department in the spring of 2002, Al-Hussayen
became a target of a Foreign FISA surveillance based on suspicious activity
reports, which were based on the amount and source of funds received from
overseas sources and of donations he made to IANA. Al Hussayen was eventually
acquitted of all material support charges, although he was deported for breaching
his immigration status. We have made repeated requests of the prosecutors to
provide us the evidence, or reference to the evidence, but so far have not
succeeded.
Data: Court documents available provide no detailed information on the
transactions.
Type of Transaction(s): Large bank transfers from accounts in one jurisdiction to
multiple accounts held by one person at multiple banks in another jurisdiction.67
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Large numbers of transfers from one personal bank account in that jurisdiction to
many different recipient accounts in the same jurisdiction.68
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, possible integration.
Proceeds of Crime? Unclear.
18. Islamic American Relief Agency, Mubarak Hamed, Ali Mohamed
Bagegni, Abdel Azim El-Siddig, Ahmad Sultan Mustafa and Khalid AlSudanee
In 1985, a Sudanese immigrant founded the Islamic African Relief
Agency. It engaged in humanitarian activities around the world, often in
partnership with similar organizations. In 2000, Islamic African Relief Agency
changed its name to the Islamic American Relief Agency (“IARA”). Meanwhile,
the entity in Sudan calling itself the Islamic African Relief Agency continued to
exist under that name. On October 13, 2004 the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset
Control (“OFAC”) designated the Islamic African Relief Agency an SDGT.
Although IARA was not independently designated, OFAC considered it to be the
United States branch of the Sudanese organization, the decision was
unsuccessfully challenged. In 2007 IARA and its employees: Mubarak Hamed,
the organization’s executive director; Ali Mohamed Bagegni; Abdel Azim ElSiddig; Ahmad Sultan Mustafa and Khalid Al-Sudanee were charged with
transferring funds from IARA’s bank accounts in the Western District of
Missouri, to ISRA’s bank accounts in Amman, Jordan. There were a total of 18
transactions ranging from $4,000 to $50,000 made in this manner.69 In 2008, they
were charged with transferring $130,000 in 8 transactions, ranging from $7,000 to
$28,000, from March 2003 to August 2004 to the Islamic Relief Agency
(“ISRA”) bank accounts in Peshawar, Pakistan, purportedly for an orphanage
housed in buildings owned and controlled by Specially Designated Global
Terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.70 In the latter indictment Mark Siljander
(“Siljander”), a former U.S. Congressman from Michigan (1981-87) and
owner/director of Global Strategies, Inc., was charged with with money
laundering, conspiracy and obstruction of justice in the case. To compensate
Siljander for his lobbying services to get IARA de-designated, IARA transferred
roughly $50,000 in funds to accounts that were controlled by Siljander at the
National Heritage Foundation and the International Foundation.
We discussed the cased with prosecutors, but a court protective order
prohibits them from providing any substantive information.
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Data: Court documents available provide no detailed information on the
transactions.
Type of Transaction(s): Direct bank transfers from a charity in one jurisdiction to
two charities in another jurisdiction.71
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.
Proceeds of Crime? Diversion of charitable donations.
19. Monzer Al Kassar, a/k/a Abu Munawar, a/k/a El Taous, Tareq Mousa Al
Ghazi and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy.
Monzer Al Kassar (“Al-Kassar”) became an arms dealer in the early 1970s
when the government of Yemen asked him to buy rifles and pistols from Poland
for them (it is alleged that those arms were then sent to various terror groups).72
In the 1970s he was arrested in both Denmark and the UK for selling hashish.73 In
1984 he was expelled from the UK for drug and arms trafficking; he then moved
to Spain.74 In 1987 investigations into the Iran-Contra scandal found that he had
been involved in selling arms to the Contras. In 1992 he made arms sales valued
in the millions of dollars to Croatia, Bosnia and Somalia, violating United Nations
arms embargoes to all three countries. Up to 2002 he collaborated with Polish
Military Information Services in illegal arms trading. 2006, Iraq called him one
of the main sources of financial and logistics support for the Iraqi insurgency. In
2007 he was approached by DEA undercover agents posing as operatives of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) wishing to use drug
proceeds to purchase weapons.75 Al-Kassar provided them with bank accounts of
individuals in Spain and Lebanon, which were ultimately were used to receive
more than $400,000 in payments through bank transfers from bank accounts of
other individuals.76
On November 20, 2008, he was convicted of money laundering and
conspiring to sell arms to suppliers for FARC. Prosecutors recently have
provided researchers with detailed bank records on these transactions.
Data: Court documents provide detailed information on the transactions.
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Type of Transaction(s): Large transfers from a number of individual bank
accounts in one country to a number of individual bank accounts in other
countries.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Placement, layering.
Proceeds of Crime? Yes.
20. Hemant Lakhani.
Hemant Lakhani (“Lakhani”) claimed to be able to buy a Stinger missile
to be used to shoot down an American plane. An FBI informant named Rehman
gave purchase money to Lakhani, told him how to send it along so that it would
look “clean” once it got to London. There were two such transfers: Rehman was
to give the money to Yehuda Abraham (“Abraham”), a jeweler in Manhattan who
also owned a money transfer business.77 Lakhani told Rehman that he would
recognize Abraham upon the presentation of a bill with a specific serial number.
Abraham then wire transferred the money from his personal account in the U.S. to
his personal bank accounts in Hong Kong and Switzerland. Lakhani then engaged
in an effort to purchase a stinger from Ukraine; a U.S./Russian sting operation
was put into motion to sell Lakhani a fake missile. At Lakhani’s request Matheena
Raja, an Indian national and businessman, made wire transfers of a total of
$86,000 in two transactions from his personal account in the U.S. to Lakhani’s
personal account in London to purchase the missile.78
Researchers discussed the case with one of the prosecutors who could not
recall any financial records being introduced as evidence.
Data: Court documents provide no detailed information.
Type of Transaction(s): Wire transfers from personal accounts in one jurisdiction
to the personal accounts of the same individual in other jurisdictions. Large wire
transfers from one personal account in the U.S. to the personal account of an
unconnected individual in another jurisdiction.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Possible. Large transfers to unrelated person
may not fit client profile.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
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21. LTTE Procurement Plot, Murugesu Vinayagamoorthy, Nachimuthu
Socrates, Thirukumaran Sinnathamby, Thirukumaran Sivasubramaniam,
Vijayshanthar
Patpanathan,
Suresh
Sriskandarajah,
Ramanan
Mylvaganam.
On August 19, 2006 defendants were arrested on Long Island after three
of them engaged in negotiations with an undercover FBI agent to purchase and
export anti-aircraft missiles and launchers and other military equipment for the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”). The defendants were allegedly
acting at the direction of senior LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka, including Pottu
Amman, the LTTE’s chief of intelligence and procurement and the right-hand
man to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan. The defendants discussed using bank
accounts in Switzerland, St. Croix, or other offshore locations to finance the
purchase. The parties also discussed a total price of between $900,000 and
$937,500 for the equipment and the training. The complaints also allege that the
defendants’ conspiracy to provide material support to LTTE included fund raising
in the United States and Canada, relying on “front” charitable organizations
including the Tamil Relief Organization and the World Tamil Coordinating
Committee to give the fund raising the appearance of legitimacy. These
organizations were also used to send goods and material to LTTE in Sri Lanka.
The defendants all pled guilty in 2009. Researchers spoke to the
prosecutors who said that because the defendants had pled guilty no transaction
records had been entered into evidence and therefore they remained confidential.
Data: Court documents provide no detailed information.
Type of Transaction(s): Unknown
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.
Proceeds of Crime? No.

22. LTTE Procurement Plot, Haji Subandi Thirunavukarasu Varatharasa,
Haniffa Osman and Erick Wotulo.
From April to September 29, 2006, Haji Subandi Thirunavukarasu
Varatharasa (“Varatharasa”), Haniffa Osman and Erick Wotulo, a retired
Indonesian General, were involved in a plot to export military weapons to the
LTTE. The case involved a sting operation. Central to the plan were two wire
transfers, one of $250,000 and one of $452,000 from a company controlled by
LTTE supporters with an account at the Eon Bank Berhad in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia to an account maintained by the undercover agents in Maryland,

supposedly to buy missiles. Varatharasa also purchased food and provisions for
his trip from Guam to deliver the weaponry to the LTTE.
All eventually pled guilty. Because of the guilty pleas no evidence was
submitted on the banking transactions. However, prosecutors provided some
detailed information on those transactions, which appeared to be simple wire
transactions from one business to another.
Data: Court documents provide some detailed information on the transactions.
Type of Transaction(s): Large wire transfers from company account in one
jurisdiction to account in another. Because a sting operation, unknown if recipient
account was profiled by bank.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.
Proceeds of Crime? Presumed No.
23. Mahmoud Maawad.
Mahmoud Maawad (“Maawad”), an Egyptian, entered the U.S. in 1999
under a tourist visa and remained after the expiration of his visa. In September,
2005, Sporty's, Inc, a company that sells pilot training materials, reported that
they had been defrauded by Maawad. Maawad had placed internet orders for
numerous books, DVD's, and pilot training software. Maawad had used an ATM
debit card to pay for the orders, but there were no funds in the account. He had
also been using a false social security number to work and attend college. When
FBI agents raided Maawad's campus apartment and found documents of Western
Union transfers to and from Maawad.
Because Maawad pled guilty no details of the Western Union transfers
were entered into evidence and none is available.
Data: Court documents provide only general description.
Type of Transaction(s): Size and origin of MSB wire transfers unknown.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.
Proceeds of Crime? Yes.

24. MEK Case, Roya Rahmani, Hossein Afshari, Mohammad Omidvar,
Hassan Rezaie, Navid Taj, Najaf Eshkoftegi, Mustafa Ahmady, and Alireza
Mohamad Moradi.
Each was charged in Los Angeles with soliciting charitable contributions
at the Los Angeles International Airport for the “Committee for Human Rights”
(“CHR”).79 This money was deposited in a CHR account in at a Bank of America
branch in Los Angeles.80 From there amounts were wired to various individuals
with bank accounts at a Turkish bank.81 From there, money was wired to the
accounts of other individuals in Turkey, then wired to the bank accounts of other
individuals in Belgium, France, the UAE, and Jordan, which was then diverted to
the People's Mujahedin of Iran (“MEK”).82 This was done after participating in a
conference call with an MEK leader, in which they learned that the State
Department had designated the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization. The MEK
leader told them to continue to provide material support despite the designation.
The money sent to the MEK through these various transactions amounted to at
least several hundred thousand dollars.
Prosecutors provided us with details of all transactions involving the US,
Belgium, and France, numbering in the tens of thousands, as well as all records of
Rahmani’s personal bank account at Washington Mutual Bank, all of which had
been admitted into evidence. They also provided us with transcripts of
conversations relating to such payments.
Data: Court documents provide detailed information on wire and check
transactions including payment records.
Type of Transaction(s): Small deposits to charity bank account in one jurisdiction,
wire transfers to large number of unrelated individual bank accounts in another
jurisdiction, then wire transfers to large number of unrelated individual bank
accounts in various additional jurisdictions, then cash withdrawn.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Yes. Layering, possible integration.
Proceeds of Crime? Diversion of charitable donations.
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25. Uzair Paracha.
Uzair Paracha (“Paracha”) was accused of conducting financial
transactions involving that al-Qaeda associate's bank account and of planning to
accepting up to $200,000 of al-Qaeda funds to be held as an investment in a
business where Paracha was employed until the funds were needed by al-Qaeda.
In 2003, an al-Qaeda associate (“AQA”) told Paracha to deposit money into his
bank account, to use his credit cards, and to close his post office box in Maryland.
He told Paracha that the reason for these tasks was to make it appear that the
AQA was still in the United States. The post office box that Paracha was to close
was held jointly by the AQA and a woman. He said that the woman was a "good
sister" who was helping them out. Paracha was to impersonate the AQA and close
the post office box, using the story that he and this woman, with whom the AQA
had rented the box, were no longer seeing each other. Paracha had possession of
the AQA’s Maryland driver's license, Social Security card, school identification,
credit cards, as well as a key to the post office box.
While Paracha was found guilty of material support this did not include
receipt of the $200,000, which was planned only. As a result there was no
evidence submitted concerning actual financial transactions other than the use of
another’s credit card in the U.S. to give the impression that that person was
physically present in the U.S. when in fact he was in Pakistan.
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.
Type of Transaction(s): Deposits.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
26. Christopher Paul
Christopher Paul (“Paul”), a 44-year-old Muslim convert and native of
Columbus, Ohio, allegedly agreed to involvement in a conspiracy to attack
European resorts where U.S. citizens are known to vacation and U.S. properties,
such as embassies and military installations. In the early 1990s, Paul traveled to
Pakistan and Afghanistan. At an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, he
received initial training in, among other things, the use of assault rifles, rocketpropelled grenades, and small unit tactics. After successfully completing this
training, he joined al-Qaeda and stayed at the Beit ur Salam guesthouse. After
fighting in Afghanistan, Paul returned to Ohio, where he began instructing
individuals in martial arts at a mosque in Columbus. He also began recruiting
local individuals with extremist intentions in order to establish a jihadist group in

Ohio. Over time and through his association with al-Qaeda, Paul became
dedicated to committing jihad and furthering the objectives of al-Qaeda and other
radical Islamic fundamentalists.
From 1993 through 1995, Paul, using various passports and names,
traveled to the Balkans and fought in conflict zones such as Bosnia, establishing
further contact with radical Islamic fundamentalists, and creating a master list of
al-Qaeda leaders and other Islamic radicals worldwide. Paul returned to
Columbus after fighting in the Balkans, and, in 1997, received a fax from two alQaeda co-conspirators in Europe asking, on behalf of “the brothers,” for Paul to
find them a “true group and place to make jihad.” While in Columbus, Paul
conducted training operations in Burr Oak State Park in Ohio with several
members of his local group, replicating terrorist training he had received in
Afghanistan and Bosnia.
On April 16, 1999, Paul traveled to meet with members of an Islamic
terror cell in Germany. Paul provided explosives training. Upon his return to Ohio
from Germany, Paul had a member of his group in Columbus purchase a
printer/scanner in May 1999. Paul also bought other equipment to be use by
extremists, including night vision equipment and a laser range finder. In
November 1999, bank records show that Paul wire transferred $1,760 to Mehdi,
one of the principal members of the German cell.
Paul was indicted on April 11, 2007, charged with conspiracy to provide
material support, namely sending money to a known terrorist figure in Europe. In
2008 Paul pled guilty to conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction. As a
result, any payments to and from Paul and others in the Ohio, the Bosnia,
Afghanistan, or Germany, including Paul’s wire transfer, were not introduced as
evidence and prosecutors could not disclose this information.
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.
Type of Transaction(s): Cross border payments of unknown type, single small
cross border wire transfer.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Unknown.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
27. The Portland 7. Patrice Lumumba Ford, Martinique Lewis , Al Saoub,
Maher “Mike” Hawash, Jeffrey Battle, Muhammad Bilal, and Ahmed Bilal.
Shortly after 9/11, a group of Muslim-Americans in Oregon sought to join
Taliban forces fighting American troops in defense of al-Qaida. They tried to
enter Afghanistan through China, but were unsuccessful and came home. The
group was led by Jeffrey Battle (“Battle”) and Patrice Lumumba Ford (“Ford”)

and included Mike Hawash. Martinique Lewis (“Lewis”), the ex-wife of codefendant Battle, was allegedly involved in money laundering. She admitted that
she transferred or transmitted money or funds from the United States to a place
outside the country for the purpose of assisting Battle in willfully supplying
services to the Taliban. When told about the money in October Lewis allegedly
wired to Battle, who federal officials said was headed to Afghanistan, the money.
Lewis did not travel with the group; she was charged with supporting the effort by
sending money to Battle in Hong Kong and Bangladesh.
All seven eventually pled guilty. In his plea agreement Ford admitted that
he had wired $500 through Western Union to Al Saoub in Guangzhou, China, and
$200 to Ahmed Bilal in Indonesia.83 He also admitted that he had wired an
additional $483 through Western Union to defendant Al Saoub in Guangzhou,
China.84 In her guilty plea Lewis also admitted that on a number of occasions she
wired money to Battle via Western Union to various locations in Hong Kong,
China and Bangladesh in amounts ranging from $100 to $400 dollars.85 They
were aware that on each occasion the money wired was to be used to support
Battle’s continuing attempts to enter Afghanistan to fight in jihad for the Taliban
against the United States and its allies.
Because of the guilty pleas details of the payments were not admitted as
evidence.
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.
Type of Transaction(s): Small number of small MSB wire transfers from one
jurisdiction to several individuals in multiple jurisdictions.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
28. The LAX Millenium Plot, Mokhtar Haouari, Abdelghani Meskini and
Ahmed Ressam. In 1994, Haouari met Ressam.
The so-called “Millennium Plot” to bomb Los Angeles International
Airport (“LAX”) in late December 1999 involved Mokhtar Haouari (“Haouari”),
Abdelghani Meskini (“Meskini”) and Ahmed Ressam (“Ressam”). In 1994,
Haouari met Ressam, a fellow Algerian, in Montréal. Between 1996 and 1997,
Ressam sold Haouari stolen identification documents, charge cards and a fake
Canadian passport. In 1998, Ressam left for Afghanistan to attend terrorist
training camps. Months before Ressam's departure, Haouari had met up with
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Meskini, another Algerian, who had arrived in Montréal in October 1997. On
various occasions between 1997 and 1999, Haouari provided Meskini with fake
Canadian passports and other forms of identification, some of which Meskini used
to commit bank and credit card fraud.
By the summer of 1999, Ressam wanted to obtain a credit card. He
contacted Haouari and asked if he could “pretend [to be] working” in Haouari's
store, Artisanat Nord-Sud, in order to qualify for a credit card. Haouari agreed. He
filled out an application for Ressam under the latter's alias, “Benni Noris.”
Ressam received the Royal Bank Visa card.
Around November 17, 1999, Ressam flew from Montréal to Vancouver.
He said that he would call Haouari and let him know when to contact his friend
Meskini. Ressam combined the $3,000 in cash he had received from Haouari
with money he already had. He bought chemicals, instruments and airline tickets
with the money. He also rented a car and paid for a hotel room. For two weeks,
Ressam stayed in Vancouver and prepared the chemical materials for the
explosives. By the beginning of December 1999, Ressam had returned to
Montréal. On his first day back, he met Haouari at the store they were opening.
Ressam said that he wanted to meet Haouari's friend in Seattle in one week.
Haouari asked Meskini to meet that man in Seattle and to give him $1500 to
$2000 in cash. On December 11, Meskini, who had purchased a round trip New
York-to-Seattle airline ticket under the alias “Eduardo Rocha,” flew to Seattle. On
December 14, 1999, Ressam called Meskini and said, “This evening, I will be in
Seattle. I'll call you.” Ressam then left Vancouver in a rental car with the
explosives loaded in the trunk. He took an auto ferry to Victoria and then another
ferry to Port Angeles.
Meskini pleaded guilty. Haouari and Ressam were found guilty of
providing material support. All transactions other than those undertaken though
the visa card was in cash. No bank transactions records were introduced into
evidence.
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.
Type of Transaction(s): Fraudulent credit card application, credit card payments.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.
Proceeds of Crime? Yes.

29. Aafia Siddiqui, Mohammad Khan
Aafia Siddiqui (“Siddiqui”), a Pakistanti national, came to the U.S. in
1990 and was later married to Mohammad Khan. She attended college and

graduate school and received a PhD in 2001. In 2001, Siddiqui made regular
debit-card payments from her account at Fleet National Bank in Boston to
Benevolence International (“BI”), designated a SDTO in 2002. From another
account they repeated debit-card purchases from stores that specialize in high-tech
military equipment and apparel, including Black Hawk Industries in Chesapeake,
Virginia and Brigade Quartermasters in Georgia. Black Hawk's website advertises
grips, mounts and parts for AK-47s and other military-assault rifles as well as
highly specialized combat clothing, including vests designed for bomb disposal.
They also made major purchases from U.S. airlines and hotels in Pittsburgh, PA
and North Carolina as well as an $8,000 international wire transfer on December
21, 2001 to an individual with an account in Habib Bank in Pakistan.86 Following
BI’s designation Fleet National Bank began an investigation and filed a
suspicious activity report.
On March 1, 2003 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, in Pakistani custody, allegedly
named Siddiqui as sympathetic. FBI Agents allegedly found evidence that she
had rented a post-office box to help a Baltimore, Maryland-based individual
alleged to have been an al-Qaeda contact who had been assigned by Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed to blow up underground gasoline-storage tanks. Siddiqui was
arrested in 2008 on charges related to attempted murder and assault of United
States officers and employees in Afghanistan. She was convicted in February
2010 of attempted murder of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. Because no other
charges were filed no evidence was admitted concerning financial institution
transactions.
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.
Type of Transaction(s): Debit card payments to a designated terrorist organization
and to high-tech military equipment companies; medium sized cross-border wire
transfer to an unknown person.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: Possible. Possible terrorist financing in repeat
purchases from military equipment store?
Proceeds of Crime? No.
30. Mohamed Adbullah Warsame.
On January 20, 2004, Mohamed Abdullah Warsame (“Warsame”), a
naturalized Canadian citizen was charged with conspiracy to provide material
support to a designated FTO. According to the allegations, in March 2000,
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Warsame traveled to Afghanistan where he attended a training camp outside
Kabul. al-Qaeda funds were used to pay for his airline ticket travel to Afghanistan
and to provide him $1,700 traveling money, although it is not known how these
payments were made. In the summer of 2000, Warsame attended the al-Faruq
training. Warsame subsequently worked at an al-Qaeda guesthouse and clinic. In
late March 2001, Warsame traveled from Pakistan, via London, to Canada. After
leaving Pakistan, Warsame wired from his individual bank account in the U.S.
approximately $2,000 to one of his former camp commanders.87 Warsame then
relocated to Minneapolis, MN. Throughout 2002-2003, Warsame continued to
exchange emails with, and provide information to, several individuals associated
with al-Qaeda.
Warsame pled guilty to one count of material support. No information
regarding financial transfers was admitted as evidence.
Data: Court documents provide only a general description.
Type of Transaction(s): Medium-sized cross border wire transfer.
Suspicious Transaction(s)? Type: No.
Proceeds of Crime? No.
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